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ZAKAT: DRAWING INSIGHTS FOR LEGAL THEORY AND
ECONOMIC POLICY FROM ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
Russell Powelt"
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of complex income taxation and welfare systems
in the 20th century might give the impression that progressive wealth
redistribution systems are uniquely modem. In fact, religious systems that
provided similar mechanisms for addressing economic injustice and poverty
alleviation are centuries old. Judaism and Christianity adopted the tithe as a ten
percent marginal tax on income, and both traditions developed pathways for
redirecting revenue to the poor. For some people, tithes and offerings to
charitable organizations for the poor remain religious obligations. Religiously
motivated charitable giving is demonstrably significant in the funding of
charities meeting the needs of the poor in the United States.' A tradition
similar to the tithe also developed in Islamic practice and jurisprudence. Zakat
(sometimes transliterated as zakah in English) is the obligation of almsgiving
t The author is an associate professor at Seattle University School of Law and would like to thank
John Makdisi, Charles Pouncy, and Frank Valdes for graciously offering to read a draft of this article and
for suggesting a range of helpful and insightful comments. Thanks also to the faculties of University of
Miami and Florida International University for their questions and comments at an FlU Faculty Colloqium,
where an earlier version of this work was presented. Finally, special thanks to my research assistant, Robert
Cadranell.
Editors Note: All translations of source documents were performed exclusively by the Author
and the Pittsburgh Tax Review does not warrant the accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information
translated by the Author.
1. Arthur C. Brooks, Religious Faith and Charitable Giving, POL'Y REV., Oct. & Nov. 2003, at 39,
39, 43, 49:
[R]eligious people are 33 percent of the population but make 52 percent of donations and 45 percent
of times volunteered. Secular people are 26 percent of the population but contribute 13 percent of
the dollars and 17 percent of the times volunteered .... [M]uch charitable activity is harmonious
with social advocacy and functions in partnership with government.
Id.
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within Islam.2 It is the Third Pillar of Islam and is a requirement for all
believers.3
In the early development of the Islamic community, zakat was collected
as a tax by the state, and the funds were distributed to defined needy groups.
4
Unlike some earlier vehicles for wealth redistribution (such as the Year of
Jubilee in the Jewish Torah), this proto-tax and welfare system was not merely
aspirational; it was legally enforced using the power of the state.5 Two
innovations make zakat relevant for modem legal scholars. The first
innovation was a progressive element in the calculation. A base amount of
wealth and income was exempt from taxation (nisab).6 This amount was
presumed to meet basic living expenses.7 The second innovation was the
taxation of the most common form of income in a largely agrarian society
(crops and livestock) along with a tax on gross wealth which was not actively
invested (cash, precious metals, etc.).' Muslim communities mobilized vast
zakat resources to meet the needs of the poor, complemented by the growth of
awqaf (the plural form of waqf, a form of trust or endowment).9
Although many insights related to zakat will only have application within
predominantly Muslim jurisdictions, the traditional jurisprudence and the
2. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM (C.E. Bosworth ed., 2004) ("The obligatory payment by Muslims
of a determinate portion of specified categories of their lawful property for the benefit of the poor and other
enumerated classes or, as generally in Quranic usage, the portion of property so paid.").
3. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 92 (1988) ("This is not regarded as charity, since
it is not really voluntary but instead is owed, by those who have received their wealth as a trust from God's
bounty, to the poor.").
4. 1 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A WORLD
CwVLzATION: THE CLASSICAL AGE OF ISLAM 97, 98 (1985).
5. Id. at 98, 287.
6. ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 2, at 411:
Zakat is due on property only if a minimum quantity is held, e.g. five camels. The zakat payable
increases with the amount of property held, and where, as in the case of livestock, such increases in
the property subject to zakat are not pro-rata, but set at discrete increments, each of these increments
represents a further nisab, with eleven such nusub [pl. of nisab] in the most complex case, that of
camels. The amount of property below the first nisab and between each subsequent nisab is termed
waks/wakas. It is generally held that no zakat is due on the waks between the nusub .... Thus the
one sheep or goat due on nine camels (the second nisab being ten) is in fact due on only five, the
four additional camels being waks, and should four of the nine perish after zakat is due, there will
be no proportionate reduction in the amount of zakat to be paid.
Id (citations omitted).
7. ECONOMICS OF ZAKAH: A BOOK OF READINGS 20 (Monzer Kahf, ed., 1997) ("The amount of
nisab must be over and above what is required to satisfy basic needs and to pay immediately due debts.").
8. Id. at 19-20.
9. Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and
Limitations of the WaqfSystem, 35 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 841, 845-46 (2001).
[Vol. 7:43
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history of zakat systems has implications for broader legal theory, especially
with regard to taxation and benefits. In particular, zakat provides an argument
for combining a wealth tax with a modest income tax, made progressive by
exempting amounts needed for basic living. It also supports the theoretical tax
and property argument elaborated by Murphy and Nagel that property rights
are in post-tax rather than pre-tax income.' °
A number of contemporary Islamic scholars reject the identification of
zakat as a form of tax and welfare." They argue that the identification with
secular legal systems robs zakat of its religious and moral power. 2 In most
contexts, a direct comparison between contemporary tax and welfare regimes
is inapt and unnecessary. When zakat is legally enforced by statute, however,
it would seem to be an appropriate subject for analysis as a system of taxation
and welfare law.
Recognizing the complexities related to religious context, this paper will
consider the implications of legally mandatory zakat as a form of taxation and
welfare. Section II begins with a thorough evaluation and synthesis of
traditional Islamic jurisprudence related to zakat. Section III will identify three
broad approaches to zakat adopted by modem Muslim nations, with particular
emphasis on ways that zakat is institutionalized legally. Section IV will present
empirical studies and analysis of the correlation of the three approaches to
zakat described in Section III with (1) individual income and (2) wealth
stratification. Section V will make observations and policy recommendations
related to zakat in its Islamic context based on the qualitative analysis in
Section III and the empirical findings in Section IV. Section VI will consider
the implications of zakat jurisprudence for law and economic theory outside
of the Islamic context.
10. Seegenerally LIAM MURPHY & THoMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
(2002) (Murphy and Nagel's core claim is that pre-tax income cannot be a moral basis for the measurement
of the fairness of tax policy. Their claim is that the ultimate social justice of the entire economic system is
the only proper end, of which taxation is a part. Thus taxation and the equity thereof can only be measured
against the resulting end.).
11. See, e.g., SIDUR RAHMAN SIDDIQUI, STUDIES IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: ZAKAT AND TAX 119
(2006) ("There is no resemblance between zakat and tax...").
12. Id. at 81 ("Zakat is an 'Ibadah [act of worship] like Salat (five time obligatory prayers).").
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 7 Pitt. Tax Rev. 45 2009-2010
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
II. CLASSICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF ZAKAT
Zakat may be translated literally as "purity" or, in its verbal form, "to be
pure."13 In its Quranic context, zakat is typically translated as "alms," which
Webster's defines as "[a]nything given gratuitously to relieve the poor, as
money, food, or clothing; a gift of charity., 14 Traditionally, alms are given out
of compassion, with the acknowledgment of economic inequality, and the
desire to fulfill a religious duty. 5 Alms in the Christian and Jewish traditions
might include both the tithe (a required contribution) and voluntary offerings. 6
The Arabic word "sadaqa" is used in the Quran as a synonym for zakat;
however, it often refers to the broader concept of charitable offerings. 7
Although some overlap will be noted, for clarification purposes, zakat will
generally refer to alms as a pious requirement and sadaqa will refer to optional
voluntary offerings, consistent with typical Quranic and jurisprudential
understandings. This section will examine the origin and apparent purposes of
zakat, with particular attention given to the Quran, Sunna (tradition of the
Mohammad), and classical Islamic jurisprudence. The latter part of this section
will consider later movements.
A. Wealth Redistribution as Pious Duty
Zakat is the Third Pillar of Islam and a requirement for Muslims.' 8 It is
rooted in a particular anthropology that understands human beings as stewards
of creation. All property ultimately belongs to God, but human beings are
charged with managing the earth and their individual property as trustees. 19
13. Suliman Bashear, On the Origins and Development of the Meaning of Zakat in Early Islam, 40
ARABICA 84, 87-94 (1993).
14. WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 42 (1913 ed.).
15. See EsposrTo, supra note 3, at 92.
16. See Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Distributing the First Fruits: Statutory and
Constitutional Implications of Tithing in Bankruptcy, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 853-54, 854 n.2 (1993)
("[l]t was the obligation of the farmer to give the 'first fruits' of the harvest, the obligation of the herder to
give a portion of the flock and so on .... [T]he obligation once thought of as a portion of the harvest is now
regarded in terms of a portion of income. From Judeo-Christian Biblical sources, where the tradition dates
back to the time of Jacob, we know of this belief as an obligation to 'tithe'.").
17. EsposiTo, supra note 3, at 34.
18. See id. at 90-92. The other Pillars are confession of faith (shahada), prayer (salah), fasting
during Ramadan (sawm), and pilgrimage (haji). Id.
19. See THE QuRAN, Surah 57:7.
[Vol. 7:43
HeinOnline  -- 7 Pitt. Tax Rev. 46 2009-2010
ZAKAT
Although ownership gives the owner rights to use, develop, and dispose of
property, the poor have some sort of claim on the property of the wealthy.20
Hoarding is specifically condemned because it keeps productive assets from
being invested and grown in the community.2' Therefore, ownership of
property carries with it attendant duties to use it wisely and productively both
for the benefit of the owner and the rest of the community.2 2 Zakat represents
a concrete manifestation of the obligation to keep property in productive uses
and to distribute a portion to others for the common good.2' The mechanics of
this system are found in the Quran and are elaborated in the Sunna and Islamic
legal treatises.
B. Primary Sources for Zakat Rules
The primary sources for the jurisprudence of zakat are the Quran and the
traditions of the Prophet or Sunna found in collections of hadith (sayings
attributed to Mohammad).24 Both sources have a variety of references to zakat
and a broader, though related, notion of sadaqa.25 The sources are then
interpreted by the classical jurists, particularly al-Ghazali. 26 There is some
20. See id. at Surah 70:24-25. This notion seems to resemble the notion of the "preferential option
of the poor" found in Catholic social thought. See Russell Powell, Theology in Public Reason and Legal
Discourse: A Cse for the Preferential Option for the Poor, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIv. RTs. & SOC. JUST. 327
(2009).
21. See THE QURAN, Surah 9:34-35. This seems consistent with the teaching of Jesus regarding
savings and investment in Christianity. See Matthew 25:14-30. (The parable tells of a master who was
leaving his home to travel, and before going gave his three servants different amounts of money. On
returning from his travels, the master asked his servants for an account of the money given to them. The first
servant reported that he was given five talents, and he had made five talents more. The master praised the
servant as being good and faithful, and gave him more responsibility because of his faithfulness. The second
servant said that he had received two talents, and he had made two talents more. The master praised this
servant in the same way, giving him more responsibility. The last servant who had received one talent
reported that knowing his master was a hard man, he buried his talent in the ground for safekeeping, and
therefore returned the original amount to his master. The master called him a wicked and lazy servant,
saying that he should have placed the money in the bank to generate interest. The master commanded that
the one talent be taken away from that servant, and given to the servant with ten talents.)
22. See YusuF AL-QARDAWi, FIQH Az-ZAKAT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 79-104 (1999).
23. See ABDUL AZiZ BIN MUHAMMAD, ZAKAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA 79-101
(1993); see id. at 8-30 (on zakat and the ethics of redistribution of income and wealth in Islam).
24. NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIc LAW 55-61 (1964).
25. See, e.g., Bashear, supra note 13.
26. See discussion infra Part H.B.3.c.
2009]
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diversity among the four Sunni schools of legal thought that will be noted.27
Shi 'ijurisprudence developed unique understandings for zakat, linking it to the
Imamate and the clerical establishment.2" Contemporary legal scholars
understand this body of thought in ways that range from the literal to the
revisionist.
1. Quranic Bases
As a pious duty, zakat is often paired with prayer (salah) in the Quran.29
The Quran contains 32 references to zakat. 3' A majority of these references are
attributed to the Medinan period,31 a period that represented Muhammad's
ministry after the flight of the Hijrah and tended to address more of the
practical concerns of organizing a burgeoning community.3 2 Although zakat
is identified with prayer and piety throughout the Quran, there is a shift from
voluntary to compulsory participation in the Medinan period.33 This move is
consistent with the needs of Muslim Medina as a growing spiritual, political,
and economic community.34 The revelations from Mecca established general
principles of stewardship and charity, and the Medinan passages transformed
these principles into rules that applied within the Muslim polity.35
27. The Sunni schools of jurisprudence include the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Shafi, and the Hanbali.
The Imami Shi'i school of jurisprudence is the Jafari. BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW
11-14 (1998).
28. See generally Norman Calder, Zakat in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence, from the Tenth to the
Sixteenth Century A.D., 44 BULL. OF THE SCH. OF ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 468 (1981). The Imamate is the
religio-political structure of governance within Shi'I Islam based on descent from the family of Muhammad,
and Ali in particular. It is distinguished from the institution of the Caliphate within Sunni Islam. Id.
29. See, e.g., THE QURAN, Surah 2:43, 83; 4:77.
30. See THE QURAN, Surah 2:43, 83, 110, 177, 277; 4:77, 162; 5:12, 55; 7:156; 9:5, 11, 18, 71;
18:81; 19:13, 31, 55; 21:73; 22:41, 78; 23:4; 24:37, 56; 27:3; 31:4; 33:33; 41:7; 58:13; 73:20; 98:5.
31. See C. SNOUCK HURGRONJE, La Zakat, in OEUVRES CHOISIES-SELECTED WORKS 150, 150
(G.H. Bousquet trans., 1957); see also THE QuRAN, Surah 2:43, 83, 110, 177, 277; 4:77, 162; 5:12, 55; 9:5,
11, 18, 71; 22:41, 78; 24:37, 56; 33:33; 58:13; 98:5.
32. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'im, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); see also THEODOR NOLDEKE, GESCIIICHTE DES QORANS
(2d ed. 1981).
33. See THE QuRAN, Surah 30:39 (an example of encouraged zakat); see also id at 2:110 (an
example of mandatory zakat).
34. See HODGSON, supra note 4, at 181.
35. See 4 ABDAHHAHAL-SHEIKH, OxFoRD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD 366-67
(2001).
[Vol. 7:43
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As previously mentioned, the term sadaqa, which literally refers to truth
and righteousness, is also translated as offering or alms.36 It is used more
broadly in the Medinan passages to refer to all charitable offerings (including
zakat).37 In the Quranic context, it is presumed to include mandatory alms
(zakat).
The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those
whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the




This passage is important in jurisprudence as it identifies eight proper
beneficiaries of zakat, even though it uses the word sadaqa for offerings and
alms. The first group of recipients is the poor (fuqara' in Arabic), those who
are in material need. 39 The second group of recipients, the needy (masakin in
Arabic), are similar.40 Although some scholars have treated these two groups
as synonymous, a more traditional view of the list in this passage is that it
describes an order of priority, so that the poor take priority over the needy.4
Some jurists came to a different conclusion and found that the needy (masakin)
have priority over the poor.42
The third category of recipients is "those who collect them." This has been
interpreted as an allocation to cover the cost of collecting and distributing
alms.43 Historically, when zakat was collected by Muslim states as a tax, this
category was used to justify state administrative costs.
44
The fourth category of recipients is "those whose hearts are to be
reconciled." It is not clear whether the hearts of this group are fully reconciled
36. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 2, at article on "Sadaqa" ("has among its meanings
that of voluntary alms, often referred to in Islamic literature as ... 'alms of spontaneity,' or... 'alms of
supererogation,' in distinction to obligatory alms, frequently also termed sadaqa, but more commonly known
as zakat.").
37. WILLIAM MONTGOMERY WATT, MUHAMMAD AT MEDINA 372 (2d ed. 1981).
38. THE QURAN, Surah 9:60.
39. HANNA E. KAssIs, A CONCORDANCE OF THE QUR'AN 431 (1983).
40. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 2, at article on "Miskin."
41. Id.
42. See id. (The normative interpretation of the Maliki school ofjurisprudence is that the needy have
priority over the poor.)
43. See KAssis, supra note 39, at 266.
44. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing zakat under Abu Bakr and modem states that collect
zakat as a mandatory tax).
20091
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or in the process of reconciliation. 4' Thus, one interpretation would include
only members of the Muslim community (possibly recent converts).46 Another
would include those who are sympathetic to Islam, but are not yet believers.
47
This second interpretation has been used to justify financial support for
missionary activities and for potential converts.48
The fifth and sixth rightful recipients are captives (al-riqab) and debtors
(al-gharimin). The freeing of captives likely refers to ransoming prisoners
captured in war or the purchasing of a slave's freedom.49 Although debtors
may include those who are enslaved, it may include others who are burdened
by debt.5°
The seventh category of zakat recipients is "for the cause of Allah."
Historically, this was used to support those who served as warriors for the
defense of Islam." However, in the absence of a limiting hermeneutic in the
fiqh (jurisprudence) literature, it could be used for a wide range of activities
that support this broad purpose.
The final category of recipients is the "wayfarers." This seems to justify
expenditure of zakat monies to support travelers.52 It may even apply to
wealthy travelers if they do not have access to their wealth. 3
2. Clarification in the Sunna
The Sunna of the Prophet (as recorded in hadith collections) provides
context for interpreting the Quran and supplies a large number of legal
standards.54 All of the major hadith collections contain reference to zakat."
45. See KASSIS, supra note 39, at 138.
46. See THE QURAN, Surah 9:60 (Yusef All trans.) ("those whose hearts have been recently
reconciled").
47. See id. (Pickthall trans.) ("here reconciliation is not completed").
48. See, e.g., discussion ofzakat in Libya infra Section llI.C.3.
49. See Bernard Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic
Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 43 (1998).
50. ABu HAMID AL-GHAzAii, MYSTERIES OF ZAXAT 65 (Nabih Amin Faris, trans., 1974) (Al-
Ghazali limits the amount that a debtor may receive to the extent of indebtedness in a separate discussion
from manumission payments.).
51. See, e.g., id. at 62.
52. NICOLAS PRODROMON AGHNtDES, MOHAMMEDAN THEORIES OF FINANCE 527 (1916).
53. See, e.g., AL-GHAZALi, supra note 50, at 63.
54. WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL
[Vol. 7:43
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Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim's collections are the most authoritative
within most Sunni jurisprudence, but Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah and
al-Nasa'i all contain sayings related to zakat.56 The works of the four founding
Sunni jurists also contain important Sunna references, but they will be
addressed more specifically in the section on classicalfiqh. The main issues
addressed by the Sunna are the spirituality of zakat, proper distribution,
legitimate recipients, the relationship between the rich and the poor, zakat as
alms, and prohibitions against begging." This analysis will focus on sayings
related to the calculation, collection, and distribution of zakat. Although a
number of the hadith cited are found in multiple sources, this section will
reference Sahih al-Bukhari unless a particular reference is not found in that
collection.
The first element critical to calculating zakat is nisab, an amount exempt
from calculation and meant to represent basic living costs.58 To the extent that
the law of zakat exempts basic living costs, it has at least one progressive
characteristic as a tax. In particular, Sahih al-Bukhari describes the nisab as
property worth less than five uqiyas of silver (about 143.3 grams), five camels,
or less than five wasqs (about 180 kg) of food.59
There are a number of rates for zakat. Crops from irrigated land are
subject to a 5% tax.60 Crops that do not require irrigation are taxed at 10%.61
Found buried treasure,62 ambergris, and pearls are subject to a 20% zakat.63
These categories seem to represent something like income in an agricultural
society reliant on cultivation. The main default rate for all other taxable goods
is 2.5% of the value.64 For short-lived goods like livestock, this may function
as a form of income tax as it does for crops. For durable goods, this functioned
as a kind of wealth tax designed to encourage active business investment in
production and trade. In Hadith 1463 and 1464, al-Bukhari exempts slaves and
AL-FIQH 10-15 (1997) (a clear account of the origin and early development of Sunna).
55. YUSUFALQARADAWI, I FIQHALZAKAH 69-75 (1999).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., 2 SAHIH AL BUKHARI, THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF SAHIH AL BUKHARI,
275-338 (Dr. Muhamad Muhsin Khan trans., 1997).
59. Id. at 876-1772.
60. Id. at 1483.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 336.
63. Id. at 335.
64. Id. at 1454.
2009]
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horses." The exemption of slaves would be consistent with the policy of
encouraging investment in production. However, the exemption of horses
seems inconsistent with the general application of zakat to livestock." This
hadith was later contradicted by Abu Hanifa, the founder of Hanafi
jurisprudence, who analogized that horses ought to be treated as other
livestock.67
With regard to zakat collections, the Sunna does document the
authorization of intermediaries within the early Muslim community. 8 The
most important hadith authorizing the community enforcement of zakat
payment is traced to Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, who justified the use of force
in collecting zakat from tribes refusing to pay.69 Abu Bakr identifies zakat
directly with prayer, implying that one who refuses to pay zakat is not truly
Muslim: "I will fight those who differentiate between prayer and zakat."7 ° So,
from the period of the first caliphate, there is precedent for the mandatory
payment of zakat to the central government, which then distributed it.
3. Classical Fiqh
Ijtihad7 ' is the art of interpretation within Islamic jurisprudence ("Ilm al-
Usul al-Fiqh")," the process of seeking to form correct legal opinions through
reasoning from the Quran and the Sunna. Whenever there was no clear text on
a particular issue, jurists used methods of analogy and consensus and,
depending upon the school of thought, custom, public policy analysis,
necessity, and judicial discretion to reach a decision consistent with Quranic
principles."
65. Id. at 1463-64.
66. Id. at 1454 (requires the normal payment of zakat on livestock (1/40)).
67. See YAsiN DuTroN, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW: TlE Qu'RAN, THE MUWATTA' AND
MADINAN AMAL 146-48 (1999) (discussion of Abu Hanifa's opinion on paying zakat on horses).
68. See, e.g., AL BUKHARI, supra note 58, at 1496.
69. See AL-QARDAWi, supra note 22, at 31-33 (Abu bakr on enforcing zakat).
70. AL BUKHARI, supra note 58, at 1400.
71. AN-NA'ai, supra note 32, at 27.
72. Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and Elements, 7 J. OF ISLAMIC L.
& CULTURE 27, 36 (2002).
73. See HALLAQ, supra note 54, at 75-95.
[Vol. 7:43
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a. Hanafi
Hanafi jurisprudence, like all the other schools of Islamic fiqh, relies
primarily on the text of the Quran. The Sunna of the Prophet (as recorded in
hadith) provides context for Quranic interpretation and supplies a large
number of legal standards. By the eleventh century, Hanafi jurists had
developed an extensive corpus of legal treatises that analogized from the text
of the Quran and hadith.74 Their use of interpretive techniques in the classical
period was broad and expressly allowed for judicial discretion.75 As mentioned
earlier, horses are subject to zakat under certain circumstances (most clearly
in Hanafi jurisprudence by analogy), even though they are specifically
exempted in a Quranic reference.76
While they expanded the class of wealth subject to zakat, Hanafi jurists
narrowed the class of those who might receive zakat.77 In particular, the class
of "those whose hearts are to be reconciled" did not apply once Islam was
firmly established.78 The significance of these positions is a willingness to
construe the intent of zakat broadly, without being bound by textual
(particularly hadith) standards that are incongruous with social and economic
circumstances. As a result, perhaps more than any of the other Sunni schools,
the Hanafi tradition is most amenable to a modem reimagining consistent with
the spiritual and redistributive purposes of zakat.
Hanafi fiqh identifies three categories of zakatable property: livestock,
crops, and gold/silver/trade goods.79 Although government authorities may
collect zakat, they are limited to forcibly collecting "visible" property
(generally livestock and crops).8" Zakat beneficiaries include the categories
listed in Surah 9:60, with an emphasis on the poor, needy, wayfarers, and
debtors within the Muslim community.81 The Hanafi scholar Abu Yusuf
74. See generally FAZLuR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION OF AN
INTELLECTUAL TRADMON (1982) (Rahman describes his "double movement" theory of Qur'anic exegesis
in relationship to traditionalfiqh).
75. See the discussion of istihsan in HALLAQ, supra note 54, at 107-1l, 130-32.
76. See DUrrroN, supra note 67.
77. Id.; see, e.g., AGHNIDES, supra note 52, at 458 (Abu Yusuf excluded non-Muslims as appropriate
recipients of zakat.).
78. See generally QARADAWI, supra note 55.
79. Id.
80. See AGHNIDES, supra note 52, at 527 (discussing differences in the treatment of visible property).
81. Id.
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specifically excludes non-Muslims as possible zakat beneficiaries.82 Donors
may not give in ways that benefit themselves.8 3 As a transfer of ownership,
proceeds must go to proper beneficiaries rather than to public purposes such
as the building of mosques.'M Abu Yusuf also recommended the appointment
of a reliable man to oversee all offerings (including zakat)" Given this
concern for the effective administration of zakat, collectors of zakat receive
priority in the receipt of their share. 6
b. Maliki
The Maliki School of jurisprudence places a distinct emphasis on
traditions and rules attributed to the early Muslim community in Medina. 7 The
treatise, Al-Muwatta, by Malik Ibn Anas contains a significant treatment of
zakat8 Unlike the other Sunni schools, the Malikis allowed zakat to be
imposed upon non-Muslims.8 9 Along with the Shafis, the Malikis view the
beneficiaries of zakat as having an actual in rem property right.90 Unlike
Hanafi jurisprudence, Maliki jurisprudence considers all zakatable property to
be subject to government collection (with no regard for whether property is
"visible" or not).91 Authorities also have broader discretionary power to
distribute zakat proceeds appropriately. 92 Combined, these elements provide
a strong basis for state collection of zakat for support for the poor.
82. See generally ABuYusuF, KiTAB AL-KHARAJ (Abid Ahmad Ali trans., 1979); see also 3 A. BEN
SHEMESH, TAXATION IN ISLAM: ABU YUSUF'S KITAB AL-KHARAJ 35-143 (1969).
83. AGHNIDES, supra note 52, at 458.
84. Id. at 456-57.
85. NORMAN CALDER, STUDIES OF EARLY MUSLIM JURISPRUDENCE 154 (1993).
86. Id.
87. See COULSON, supra note 24, at 43-47 (describing the jurisprudence of Imam Malik IBN Anas).
88. See IMAM MALIK [RN ANAS, AL-MUWAT-rA OF IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS: THE FIRST FORMULATION
OF ISLAMIC LAw 93-110 (Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley trans., 2001).
89. Id. at 109 ("Umar ibn al-Khattab used to take a twentieth from the cereals and olive oil of the
Nabatean Christians, intending by that to increase the supply to Madina. He would take a tenth from
pulses.").
90. See generally Powell, supra note 20.
91. See AGHNIDES, supra note 52, at 527.
92. See IMAM MALIK RN ANAS, supra note 88, at 103 ("The position with us concerning the dividing
up zakat is that it is up to the individual judgment of the man in charge.").
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c. Shaft
In his book, Al-Risalah, Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i, who studied in
Medina under Malik ibn Anas,93 was the first jurist to systematically record the
general rules of interpretation, which consider analogy and consensus to be
explicitly secondary sources of jurisprudence, subordinate to the Quran and
Sunna.94 The Shafis do not view debt as any sort of adjustment or limitation
on the amount of zakat owed.95 Although the Shafis adopt the Hanafi
distinction between "visible" and "non-visible" goods, nearly all goods are
considered "non-visible," thus removing them from the collection authority of
the government. 96
Although al-Ghazali wrote within the Shafifiqh tradition, his book, The
Mysteries ofAlmsgiving, is an important source with broad influence beyond
the realm of sectarian legal scholarship.97 The first section of the book
addresses the calculation of zakat. 9a The categories of possessions subject to
zakat are livestock, gold/silver, trade goods, buried treasure or mineral wealth,
and crops.99 As described earlier, some of these categories have fixed rates of
zakat. °° However, the rate applied to livestock, trade goods, and crops is more
complicated. Under the presumption of an annual planting season, zakat is
annually owed on crops when mature and ready for market.' ' Except for
buried treasure, a certain base level of ownership (nisab) is exempted from
zakat °2 In general, zakat is to be paid in kind." 3
93. HODGSON, supra note 4, at 327.
94. See COULSON, supra note 24, at 53-61 (describing the role of al-Shafi'l as "the father of Muslim
jurisprudence").
95. See, e.g., ABu HAMIDAL-GHAZAL, THE MYSTERIES OF ALMSGvNG 6 (Nabih Amin Faris trans.,
1974) ("[M]ortgaged livestocks are liable to the zakat because the owner himself has been responsible for
the sequestration."). "It is also due on the debt of a solvent person capable of paying his debt." Id. at 11.
96. See AGHNIDES, supra note 52, at 526-27.
97. AL-GHAZALI, supra note 95.
98. Id. at 5-16.
99. Id. at 5. Note that AI-Ghazali also considers food used to break the Ramadan fast as a category
ofzakat, but this form of zakat is separate from the annual zakat on possessions, which is the central concern
of this article.
100. Id. at 11 (As in all of the other schools ofjurisprudence, the Shafi'! School fixes the rate ofzakat
on gold and silver at 2.5%.).
101. Id. at 10-11 ("The zakat is due at the time when the fiuits become ripe and the grains harden;
it is actually collected after the crop has been dried and sifted.").
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 19 ("That no substitute based on the value of the zakat be offered in its stead .... [T]hus
silver will not take the place of gold, nor gold the place of silver, even though the substitute may exceed that
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The second section of The Mysteries of Almsgiving identifies three
important standards for paying zakat. First, payment should be made
promptly."° This is particularly true for crops that could decompose. 5
Second, zakat should be paid where the owner lives because the poor have a
claim to wealth produced in their community. 0 6 Third, zakat funds are to be
divided equally among appropriate groups of beneficiaries.' 7 Beneficiaries
include the eight found in Surah 9:60; however, the classification of "the cause
of Allah" is explicitly replaced with a reference to warriors.' Consistent with
the redistributive values reflected in zakat, al-Ghazali emphasizes the
categories of the poor and needy, whom he defines as those unable to make
any living and those who do not earn enough to cover their living costs,
respectively.'0 9 However, Shafi jurisprudence generally requires equal
distribution to the applicable beneficiary categories in order to avoid human
discretion in the allocation process. Significantly, both the acts of giving and
receiving zakat are considered in a spiritual context, which is consistent with
the understanding that such acts are related to worship, like prayer."0
d. Hanbali
Ahmad ibn Hanbal was born in Rabi in 780, and was influenced by the
work of Imam Shafi'i (whom Hanbal is reputed to have met once) as well as
prominent Maliki scholars."' His jurisprudence emphasized a literal reading
of the Quran and hadith, limiting the use of analogy and other interpretive
sources which tended to increase judicial discretion and innovation." 2
According to the Hanbalis, zakat liability does not apply to debt owed on gold,
silver, or trade goods in order to avoid the situation in which a person might
otherwise owe zakat even when his actual net worth does not exceed the
nisab."3
for which it is substituted.").
104. Id. at 18-19.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 23.
107. Id. at 23-25.
108. Id. at 23-24.
109. Id. at 56-58.
110. See, e.g., id. at 25-27 (with regard to giving zakat), 64-73 (with regard to receiving zakat).
111. For an article on Abmad ibn Hanbal, see ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 2, at 272.
112. See COLSON, supra note 24, at 71-73.
113. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 2, at 415 (discussing "Debts" in section ix).
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5. Historical Disjunction
One challenge to the continued development offiqh was the notion of the
"closing of the gates of ijtihad." There is a shift in the nature of legal discourse
starting in the tenth and eleventh centuries from reliance on judicial
interpretation (at least in the form of innovation) to a reliance on prior
precedent and "imitation" (taqlid)."1 4 As a theoretical matter, the extensive
body of manuals and opinions collected by this time made the continued
development of legal doctrine seem unnecessary. Although legal discourse did
not disappear, it was contextualized differently, so that calls for a return to the
overt exercise of i'tihad remain controversial for some scholars." 5
6. Later Juridical Movements
The "modernist" approach is perhaps best represented by Sayyid Ahmed
Khan, a major Muslim thinker and reformer in nineteenth century India. 16
Like Muhammad Abduh in the Arabic-speaking world, he advocated a
reexamination of Ytihad-a new hermeneutic." 7 His writing and the
institutions he founded (most famously, Aligarh Muslim University) shaped
generations of Muslims under British colonial rule; his modernist approach to
jurisprudence had a profound impact on Islamic legal thought by opening legal
discourse to new interpretations and the implications of science.' 
8
Another modem trend in a number of Muslim countries has been to
consider state law an expression of Islamic law." 9 This is true to some extent
in diverse jurisdictions such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Iran. As this trend
coalesces, it seems to create a new sort of Islamic discourse that has legitimacy
114. See Mohammad Fadel, The Social Logic of Taqlk and the Rise of the Mukhtasar, 3 ISLAMIC LAW
AND Soc'Y 193, 193 (1996) (for a highly nuanced treatment of the development of taqlid).
115. See HALLAQ, supra note 54, at 43-47.
116. See 3 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A
WORLD CIVILIZATION, THE GUNPOWDER EMPIRES AND MODERN TIMES 334-35 (1985).
117. See SIDDIQUI, supra note 11, at 55-56.
118. Id.
119. See generally CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAw AS ISLAMIC LAw IN MODERN EGYPT: THE
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI'A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006) (finding three approaches
to deriving Islamic legal norms: traditionalfiqh, utilitarian neo-ijtihad, and comparative neo-taqlid).
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as an expression of the traditions, as a new form of itihad, or as valid
application of precedent (taqlid).120
C. Legacy Outside of the Muslim Context
Outside of the religious context, the traditional jurisprudence of zakat
made significant contributions to theories of tax and distribution. It proposes
what amounts to a wealth tax combined with a modest income tax, made
progressive with an exemption for basic living costs. Although we do not
know details relating to the efficiency of this system in the early history of the
Muslim community, we know that it was enforced relatively widely for the
first few centuries of Islam.' 2' The second generalizable principle in the
jurisprudence of zakat is the theory of both property and social justice that
ownership rights do not apply to pre-zakat (tax) income. Beneficiaries of zakat
have an actual property right in the wealth of the rich to the extent of zakat.
This could be analogized to a right of the poor to benefits funded by taxes, and
would argue against the libertarian notion of ownership rights in pre-tax
income. 22 These ideas will be further explored in Section VI below.
III. MODERN STATE APPROACHES TO ZAKAT
The modem civil codes of predominantly Muslim nations take a wide
variety of approaches to zakat. The most common approach is to ignore it
altogether.'23 Another approach is for the government to establish entities to
collect and distribute voluntary zakat contributions, typically in the interest of
transparency and accountability. The third approach is to collect zakat as if it
were a tax and to distribute it as an analog to welfare. There are a variety of
permutations to the actual rules for these sorts of zakat statutes, though all are
ostensibly justified according to classicalfiqh in some sense.
120. Id.
121. See Kuran, supra note 9, at 845.
122. See generally MURPHY &NAGEL, supra note 10, at 31-36.
123. See infra app. A.
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A. No Place for Zakat
Of the forty predominantly Muslim countries, twenty-four do not
institutionalize zakat. 124 This is true for Turkey which, in the early history of
the Turkish Republic, intentionally established a secular legal system based on
European civil codes.2 5 However, it is also true for a number of countries that
actively incorporate elements of traditional Islamic law into their modem
codes, in areas such as family law, inheritance, and even banking.2 6 This is
clearly a more complex issue for countries that have decided to incorporate
aspects of Islamicfiqh into their legal systems.
Which elements of traditional zakat jurisprudence are included in modem
statutes, why, and in what ways? In many cases, a state-enforced system would
duplicate taxation (VAT, income, etc.) and benefits programs established in
the last century according to European and North American models. Perhaps
ironically, there is evidence that countries with no legal rules regarding zakat
in some cases have higher giving rates than those that do.127 According to one
study, in 2004, 69% of Turks gave zakat, while only 60% of Pakistanis did
(living in a country that makes zakat mandatory). 128 This difference might be
explained by relative wealth. It is likely that a smaller percentage of Pakistanis
are obliged to give zakat, either according to classicalfiqh or their own laws
due to the exemption of nisab.129 In any case, zakat contributions tend to




125. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY 402-04 (1961) (historical role of
secularism in the early Turkish Republic); see also Adrien Katherine Wing & Ozan 0. Varol, Is Secularism
Possible in a Majority-Muslim Country?: The Turkish Example, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 5-7 (2006).
126. See LOMBARDI, supra note 119, at 270-74; see generally Sherman Jackson, Shari'ah,
Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88 (2003) (regarding important arguments for the compatibility of Islamic
jurisprudence and state law).
127. See Riaz Hassan, Giving and Gaining: Philanthropy and Social Justice in Muslim Societies,
LAHORE J. POL'Y STUD. (2007).
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id (listed amounts for Turkey as US$ 214 million and Pakistan as 4 billion Rupees.)
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B. Facilitating Collection and Distribution of Zakat
In the absence of zakat laws, alms are given on a voluntary and
decentralized basis."'3 There is some economic evidence that voluntary giving
to local groups or individuals favors certain categories of beneficiaries, for
example, those with a relationship to the giver, and that this pattern of giving
tends not to provide for sufficient redistribution of wealth to alleviate systemic
poverty.'32 For this reason, and a number of others related to transparency and
accountability, some nations have established government-supported entities
to receive and distribute voluntary zakat contributions. This approach has
garnered more support after 9/11, when investigations of some Islamic
charities revealed charitable gifts to entities related to organized "terrorist"
activities. 133 Both Muslim governments and individual donors recognized the
value in ensuring that zakat was administered consistent with its religious
purposes and with sufficient levels of disclosure to satisfy donors. 34 Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Iran, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, the UAE,
Indonesia, and Oman all have some form of centralized zakat collection and
distribution with varying degrees of governmental oversight and involvement.
1. Egypt
Although Egypt has not institutionalized zakat as a mandatory tax, Nasser
Social Bank of Eqypt has a large Department of Zakat. a5 Nasser Social Bank
was established pursuant to Law No. 66 of 1971 as a financial institution
reporting to the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs. 36 It aims to expand
the social solidarity base by granting soft loans and aid to those in lower
income brackets.3 7 It works with thousands of local committees to collect and
131. Id.
132. ANDY AGUNG PRIHATNA, MUSLIM PHILANTHROPY: POTENTIAL AND REALITY OF ZAKAT IN
INDONESIA: SURVEY RESULTS IN TEN CreES 67-70 (Kurniawati ed., 2005).
133. See, e.g., Barnett F. Baron, The Treasury Guidelines Have Had Little Impact Overall on U.S.
International Philanthropy, But They Have Had a Chilling Impact on US.-Based Muslim Charities, 25
PACE L. REv. 307, 315-16 (2005).
134. See PRIHATNA, supra note 132, at 67-70.
135. ECONOMICS OF ZAKAH, supra note 7, at 36.
136. Law No. 66 of 1977 (Egypt) (establishing the Nasser Social Bank).
137. See Egypt State Info. Serv., 2006 Yearbook, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/ListTemplate
.aspx?CategoryED=869.
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distribute zakat funds. 3 s The bank has served as an established model for other
countries interested in centralizing zakat administration. 39 During its
2004-2005 fiscal year, the bank invested over one billion Egyptian Pounds.1"
Zakat proceeds for the same period equaled approximately 110 million
Egyptian Pounds 4 and rose to 128 million the following year.'42 According
to one survey, 89% of Egyptians gave zakat in 1998.'
Although rumors occasionally surface indicating government plans to
legally enforce zakat contributions, such proposals have been met with
widespread opposition even from the ulema (the community of Islamic
scholars).'" The Islamic Research Centre of Al-Azhar University (the world's
oldest university and the most important historical center in Islamic
scholarship) recently issued a fatwa (legal opinion) ruling that the Egyptian
government should pay 20% zakat (the traditional amount for mineral
deposits) on its oil and gas sales. 14 This could amount to more than two billion
dollars that would be redistributed largely to the poor. 46 Thisfatwa seems to
indicate both that poverty is an increasingly important political problem in
Egypt and that Islamic legal scholars are open to creative new applications of
traditionalfiqh as a source of moral suasion.
2. Jordan
The Zakat Act in Jordan was passed in 1978 and established a Zakat Fund
under the Ministry of Awqaf 1 47 Jordan officially encourages contributions to
the Zakat Fund and such contributions are deductible from income for tax
138. Id.
139. EcONOMICS OF ZAKAH, supra note 7, at 36.
140. See Egypt State Info. Serv., supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Hassan, supra note 127.
144. See Mona el-Nahhas, Who's the Poorer?, AL-AHRAM WKLY. ONLINE, Jan. 24-30, 2002,
http://weeklyahram.org.eg/2002/570/eg4.htm. Even Tantawi from AI-Azhar suggested that direct
government control and enforcement of zakat would be fraught with inefficiencies and would encourage
evasion and corruption.
145. Maya El Kaliouby, Egypt Fatwa Orders Oil Money for the Poor, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, July 31,
2008, available at http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2008/06/15/egyptfatwa-orders-oil-moneyfor_
the._poor.htm.
146. Id.
147. Zakat Act of 1978 (Jordan).
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purposes.'48 No more than 10% of zakat funds can be used for administrative
purposes (although salaries can be paid by the Ministry itself).' 49 In 2007, the




In Act No. 5 of 1982, Kuwait established the Zakat House, which receives
voluntary zakat contributions along with an annual government grant.' 5'As in
Jordan, the Kuwaiti zakat administration is affiliated with the Ministry of
Awqaf 52 All administrative costs are internalized within the ministry.
Kuwait has recently moved toward mandatory enforcement of zakat, but only
for local public and shareholding companies, which pay zakat at the rate of one
percent of net profit. 54 Since this change is only now coming into force, this
article will consider Kuwait a voluntary zakat jurisdiction to reflect the historic
data that is currently available.
4. Iran
Iran is the only Shi'i jurisdiction that this article addresses with any
particularity. Shi'i rules for alms (zakat and the related tax of khoms in
Shi'ism) require zakat on certain goods and a donation of 20% of income that
will be distributed by the Imam or his proxy (the ulema in the case of modem
Imami Shi'ism found in Iran). 55 Zakat (here referring to zakat and khums, or
148. Zakat Act of 1978 amended 1982 (Jordan).
149. Id.
150. The Zakat Fund of Jordan, http://www.zakatfund.net/cutenews/news.php (last visited Jan. 9,
2010).
151. Law No. 5 of 1982 (Kuwait) (concerning the establishment of the Zakat House); see also
ECONOMICS OF ZAKAH, supra note 7, at 36-37.
152. Act No. 5 of 1982 (Kuwait); see also Kuwait Zakat House, http://www.zakathouse.org.kw/
AxCMSwebLivelar index.cms.
153. ECONOMICS OFZAKAH, supra note 7, at 37 ("[A]s the House is affiliated to the ministry of Awqaf
and Religious Affairs all its administrative expenditures are carried out by the general budget of the
government.").
154. Law No. 46 of 2006 (Kuwait) (on zakat); Ministerial Res. No. 58 of 2007 (Kuwait).
155. See ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI, ISLAM AND GENDER: THE RELIGIOUS DEBATE IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN
12 (1999).
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giving of the fifth, in Shi'ism) was viewed as a moral rather than a legal
obligation by the revolutionary government. Although controversial at the
time, the late Ayatollah Khomeini reinstated the Iranian income tax during the
Iran-Iraq War after having earlier overturned it as un-Islamic.'56 Particularly
during the war, the income tax was justified on the basis of necessity
(zarura).' 7 Zakat thus remains a pious, though legally unenforced, duty.
According to 1998 survey information, 44% of Iranians paid zakat. 15t
Alms are generally received by "bonyads," which are religious or charitable
foundations. The largest bonyad, Bonyad-e Mostazafin, supports the family
members of martyrs and has $12 billion in assets and employs 400,000." 9
Bonyads in Iran are estimated to control about 40% of the non-oil wealth of the
country. 16
5. Bangladesh
Bangladesh founded its Zakat Fund according to the Zakat Fund
Ordinance in 1982.161 It is authorized to receive and distribute zakat
contributions. 62 As in Jordan, contributions are deductible from income tax.1
63
The Board of the Zakat Fund consists often Islamic law scholars appointed by
the government, the Secretary of the Religious Affairs Division, and the
Director-General of the Islamic Foundation.'" The Zakat Fund is currently
providing medical care to poor children; giving scholarships to poor but
meritorious students; distributing rickshaws, vans, sewing machines, cattle,
and poultry to help alleviate poverty; building homes for the homeless;
assisting small businesses with start-up capital; and providing disaster relief
to stricken areas.
61
156. HOMA OMID, ISLAM AND THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY STATE OF IRAN 141 (1994) ("Payment of
such taxation is a religious duty. Just as the Muslims have an obligation to pay their religious dues, so they
must also pay their national taxes to the Islamic government.").
157. Id.
158. See Hassan, supra note 127.
159. ROBIN WRIGHT, THE LAST GREAT REVOLUTION 278 (2000).
160. Id.
161. See Ordinance No. VI of 1982 (Bangl.).
162. Id. §3.
163. Id. § 13.
164. Id. § 5.
165. BANGLADESH HIGH COMM'N, Canberra Notice (2008), http://www.bangtadoot-canberra.org/
media/pdf/OldNotices/Notice%2016.pdf.
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6. Bahrain
Bahrain established a zakat law similar to that of Jordan's in 1979."6 In
2003, the Zakat Fund had dropped to almost nothing as donors chose to
contribute to other entities. 167 With mounting pressure to fund public
programs, Bahrain established a mandatory 1% "social insurance tax" on
income in 2007 to help fund unemployment benefits.168 Significantly, this tax
has not been identified as a form of zakat, and this has drawn criticism as an
un-Islamic form of taxation. 169 Like Kuwait, Bahrain will be analyzed as a
voluntary zakat jurisdiction because the recent changes are not reflected in the
historic economic data analyzed in Section IV.
7. United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates ("UAE") has a Zakat Fund similar to those
found in Jordan, Kuwait, Bangladesh and Bahrain. 170 Along with Kuwait and
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates has considered instituting an income tax
which might include a zakat component.'71 The UAE's Zakat Fund has a board
of directors formed under the chairmanship of the Minister of Justice, Islamic
Affairs and Endowments.172 The board has the power to set general fund policy
and approve distribution amounts, and also to remind Muslims of the zakat
duty and urge them to pay zakat' 73 The fund's sources of revenue are amounts
which Muslims voluntarily pay to the fund, contributions from other entities,
a budget allotment from the UAE's general budget, and amounts generated by
166. Decree Law No. 8 of 1979 (Bahr.) (establishing the Zakat Fund).
167. See Mohammed ALAI A'Ali, Bahrain: Zakat Coffer Empty, GULF DAILY NEWS, Nov. 12,2003.
168. Social Insurance Tax of June 2007 (Bahr.); see also ASS'N OF INT'L LIFE OFFICES, EXPATRIATE
FiNANctAL GUIDE TO BAHRAIN (2008).
169. Bahrain's Income Tax, First in Gulf Sparks Opposition, KHALEEJ TIMEs, June 26, 2007,
available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile-/data/business/2007/June/business_
June839.xml&section=business.
170. See Federal Law No. 4 (2003) (U.A.E.); see also Talal Malik, GCC Can Rake Billions in Zakat,
Income Tax, ARABIAN Bus., Sept. 12, 2007, available at http://www.arabianbusiness.comlproperty/
article/500208-gcc-can-rake-billions-in-zakat-income-tax.
171. Malik, supra note 170.
172. Federal Law No. 4, supra note 170, art. 9.
173. Id. art. 10.
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the fund's own activities. 74Distribution of zakat funds is limited strictly to the
eight categories mentioned in the Quran.'75
8. Lebanon
Lebanon has a zakat fund similar to that in Jordan.'76 It receives and
distributes zakat donations.'77 Although the majority of the population in
Lebanon is Muslim, the community is highly fragmented and the current
constitution preserves disproportionate Christian representation in the Majlis
(Parliament) and senior government positions. 7 '
9. Indonesia
Indonesia is unique in a number of ways. First, along with Malaysia, it is
far removed from the core of the Arab Middle East. Second, Islam came to the
region somewhat later and as part of a religious phenomenon with relatively
less political entanglement.'79 Third, according to surveys, Indonesia has the
highest rate of zakat giving among surveyed nations at 94%, with the rate even
higher for those with higher education, even though zakat is not mandatory.'80
Indonesia has established governmental organizations to collect and
distribute zakat and regulates all private zakat collection and distribution;'
Regional "BAZ" are semi-autonomous zakat agencies that collect and
distribute contributions. 82 They compete (often unfavorably) with a variety of
174. Id. art. 5.
175. Zakat Fund, United Arab Emirates, Categories of Zakat Recipients, http://www.zakatfund.net/
en/eCategories-of-zakat.php.
176. See Lebanon's Zakat Fund, http://www.zakat.org.lb/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
177. Id.
178. See Chibli Mallat, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 13, 41-42, 51-53 (2006) (addressing the challenge of stability and institution building in
fragmented societies, using Lebanon as an example).
179. 2 MARSHALL G. S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A WORLD
CIVILzATtON: THE ExPANSIoN OF ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE PERIODS (1985).
180. See Hassan, supra note 127.
181. Law of Zakat Management No. 38 (1999) (Indon.).
182. See Taufik Abdullah, Zakat Collection and Distribution in Indonesia, in THE ISLAMIC
VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 59-61 (Inst. of Se. Asian Studies ed., 1991).
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other charities and direct giving."3 Ministry of Religion Decision No.
581/1999 specifically addressed the role of governmental BAZ and
nongovernmental zakat collectors known as LAZ. 8 Contributions are
deductible up to 2.5% of net income. 5 Although the percentage of zakat funds
collected by BAZ went from 4% in 2000 to 9% in 2004, these governmental
organizations still account for a small portion of overall zakat funds, most of
which go to local individuals and mosques.'
10. Oman
Direct taxation in Oman is limited. 7 Zakat payment, although not
mandatory, is administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and
Endowments.' Zakat funds are distributed to "eligible recipients," and the
funds also pay for printing copies of the Quran and distributing religious
works to mosques, students, and other individuals. 9
C. Zakat as Tax and Welfare
There are a number of predominantly Muslim countries that enforce
collection of zakat: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Sudan, Malaysia and
Yemen. The standards for each system vary greatly though all claim
legitimacy as rooted in traditionalfiqh.
183. PRIHATNA, supra note 132, at 67-70.
184. Id. at 21-23.
185. Decision of Director General of Tax No. KEP-163/PJ/2003 (2003) (Indon.).
186. See PRIHATNA, supra note 132, at 22.
187. Malik, supra note 170.
188. Id
189. See MinistryofInformation, Sultanate of Oman, Oman 2002-2003, AwqafandReligious Affairs,
http://www.omanet.om/english/oman2004/AWQAF%/2OAND%2ORELIGIOUS%20AFFAIRS.asp (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009).
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1. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has the oldest statutory system of zakat collection. It is even
listed as a sort of constitutional requirement in the Saudi Basic Law. 90 The
most recent version of the law provides that all Saudi and Gulf Cooperation
Council Nation citizens and companies, who conduct business in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia in commercial goods, pay zakat at the rate of 2.5%. 9' Zakat
payers are required to file a declaration showing zakatable goods, properties,
cash, and profits. 192 A financial officer reviews the declaration and then
informs the zakat payer of the amount of zakat that is owed.' 93 Although the
traditional zakat for crops and livestock is still collected, the regulations focus
on accounting details for calculating zakatable worth on cash, investments, and
real estate.' 94
2. Pakistan
One of the chief components of Zia ul Haq's Islamization program for
Pakistan was the compulsory collection of zakat under the Zakat and Ushr
Ordinance of 1980 (the "Ordinance").195 At least one earlier attempt was made
to institutionalize zakat payment in the 1950's.196 A commission suggested that
the government ought to collect zakat.197 For a brief time, "zakat tickets" could
be purchased at post offices, and the proceeds were to be distributed to
appropriate beneficiaries.9 8 This earlier program was not continued, primarily
due to lack of participation.' 99 Pakistan's zakat system has been studied by a
190. Saudi Basic Law art. 21 (Saudi Arabia) ("Zakat... shall be levied and dispensed to its legitimate
beneficiaries.").
191. See Decree No. 61/5/1 of 5/1/1383 H (28/5/1963 CA) (Saudi Arabia) (on Zakat). It is further
elaborated by Ministerial Res. No. 393 art. 6 of 6/8/1370 H (13/5/1950 CA) (Saudi Arabia).
192. Ministerial Res. No. 393, supra note 191, art. 8.
193. Id. art. 9.
194. Id. arts. 5-6.
195. Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980 (Pak.).
196. Parvez Ahmad Butt, Pakistan, in INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH: DIMENSIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS 379, 380 (Ahmed Abdel-Fattah el-Ashker & Muhammad Sirajul Haq eds., 1995) [hereinafter
INsTrTUmONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH].
197. TANZIL UR-RAHMAN, INTRODUCrION OF ZAKAT IN PAKISTAN 8 (1981); see also Notes of the
Quarter: Zakat in Pakistan, 45 MUSLIM WORLD 204, 205 (1955).
198. UR-RAHMAN, supra note 197, at 9.
199. Id.
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number of scholars over the past 25 years, so data and commentary are more
readily available than for most other jurisdictions.
As a tax, zakat was initially intended to provide a redistributive
mechanism that might alleviate poverty within Pakistan; however its present
role as a part of Islamization does not depend on its pragmatic value as a tax.
Historically, it had been enforced at the state level by the Moghul Empire and
was incumbent upon all Muslims."°
Data suggests that prior to passage of the Ordinance, only 5% of
Pakistanis actually practiced zakat.2"' State enforced income taxes were also
evaded on a wide scale, so one aim of Islamization in this area was to increase
buy-in for redistributive tools by rooting them in Islam.2°2 In fact, the
Ordinance did receive support from such key religious leaders as Maulana
Maududi, Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad and Khurshid Ahmad Naqui.2"3 However,
from the beginning there was vocal opposition, particularly from non-Sunni
communities.ta
The most obvious mechanism for enforcing zakat in Pakistan relies on
banks and other depository institutions to transfer appropriate contributions
based on deposits (these are often referred to as First Schedule Zakat funds)
on an annual record date, the first day of Ramadan."' Zakat is taken at the rate
of 2.5% over the nisab, which is considered the current value of 612.3 grams
of silver.20 6 In 1980, this amount was calculated to be 2000 rupees.2 7 The
advantage of this system is that it lowers collection costs by putting the onus
on depository institutions to calculate and forward zakat, which can essentially
be automated. One consistent disadvantage has been the phenomenon of
massive withdrawals immediately before the announced date of zakat
calculation and transfer.208
200. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islamization and Taxation in Pakistan, in ISLAMIC REASSERTION IN
PAKISTAN 67 (Anita M. Weiss ed., 1986).
201. Grace Clark, Pakistan 's Zakat and Ushr System from 1979 to 1999, in PAKISTAN 2000, at 141
(Charles H. Kennedy & Craig Baxter eds., 2000).
202. Mayer, supra note 200, at 67.
203. Clark, supra note 201, at 141 (explaining Pakistan's zakat and Ushr as a Welfare System).
204. Pakistan: Islamic Taxes, ASIAN REcoRDER, July 29-Aug. 4, 1980, at 15578.
205. Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, supra note 195, ch. 1, § 2 (xxxii).
206. Id.
207. Mayer, supra note 200, at 67 (regarding Islamization and taxation in Pakistan).
208. See, e.g., Mohiuddin Aazim, Rush for Cash Withdrawal Recedes: Zakat Deduction, DAWN,
Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.dawn.com/2002/l1/08/ebrl.htin ("Rsl2-15 billion used to flow out
of the system on the eve of Ramazan, though the bulk of it would flow in back to the system after a couple
of weeks").
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The second form of zakat under the Ordinance is ushr, or a 5% zakat on
agricultural goods (described as Second Schedule Zakat funds).2" Although
the law sets forth the class of people who are subject to contributing zakat, the
Revenue Department ofProvinical Governments have not been assessing zakat
on crops in accordance with the statute.2 ° In fact, as with traditional voluntary
zakat, amounts over 5% required byfiqh (such as for crops from unirrigated
land), may be paid directly to the appropriate beneficiaries without an
intermediary."' Alternatively, it may be paid to local zakat committees.2 2
Zakat funds are managed at the federal, provincial and local levels. 21 3 First
Schedule Zakat is received at the federal level and is then distributed to
provincial committees.214 Some of this money is used for provincial level
projects, but most is directed to local committees who distribute first schedule
zakat funds in addition to collecting and distributing second schedule zakat
funds.2 5 Federal zakat administration expenses are paid by the government.
Local zakat committee costs are borne locally and are limited to 10% of
collected zakat.2"6 Many responsibilities at the local level are shared by
volunteers in order to limit costs.
217
There are three oft-repeated religious criticisms of the Ordinance. The first
concerns the category of persons required to pay zakat. It has been argued that
zakat's application to corporations has no precedent in Islamicfiqh and that the
collection of zakat from the accounts of minors conflicts with Hanafi fiqh,
which is dominant in the region."' Second, distribution has been criticized.
Since zakat monies are used to fund community programs, it is possible that
donors might benefit from their own contributions in violation of traditional
fiqh.219 Also, the emphasis on meeting the needs of the poor might limit access
209. Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, supra note 195, ch. 3.
210. RELIGIoUS AFFAIRS MINISTRY OF PAKISTAN, ZAKAT COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTIoN SYSTEM
4-5 (2005), available at http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/ministries/religious-affairs-ministry/media/
zakatCollectionandDistributionSystem.doc. Interestingly, two provinces have not received any zakat on
crops (ushr) since 2000-not even voluntary contributions. The remaining two provinces collected miniscule
amounts during this period, which might be attributed to voluntary contributions.
211. See Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, supra note 195, ch. 4, § 6.
212. Id.
213. Id. ch. 5.
214. See id. ch. 4, § 7.
215. Id. ch. 5, § 18.
216. Id. ch. 4, § 8b.
217. See Clark, supra note 201, at 144 (examining Pakistan's Zakat and Ushr system from
1979-1999).
218. Mayer, supra note 200, at 68.
219. See, e.g., Malik supra note 170 (donors may not receive back their offerings).
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by other legitimate potential beneficiaries of zakat.22° The third category of
religious criticism has focused on the collection of zakat, in particular when
the default system conflicts with particular rules of legal schools. This is most
obvious among Shi 'a who objected to enforcement of zakat standards that are
inconsistent with Shi 'ifiqh.22 An amendment to the Ordinance responded to
this problem by allowing Shi'a to opt out of the system and exempt their
accounts from mandatory withdrawal.222 Some Sunni Muslims criticized this
move on equality grounds, and gained the right to claim exemption in 1999,
in the Pakistani Supreme Court.
223
3. Libya
Libya's Zakat Act was issued in 1971.224 Unlike some other similar acts,
zakat is collected on livestock and crops, but not on monetary assets.22' A
General Directorate for Zakat collects contributions, but they are distributed
by the Social Welfare Department of the Libyan government.226 Of the
proceeds, 50% are dedicated to supporting the poor and needy, and no more
than 10% can support the costs of the Directorate.227 Thirty percent of funds
are allocated to the Organization of Islamic Call, which supports Libyan
promotion of Islam outside the country.228 This allocation is intended to cover
the Quranic zakat categories of "those whose hearts are to be reconciled" and
"for the cause of Allah.,
229
220. Mayer, supra note 200, at 68.
221. Id. at 72.
222. Id. at 71-73.
223. See Pakistan v. Farzana Asa, Supreme Court of Pak., 9 Mar. 1999 (Pak.).
224. Act No. 89 of 1971 (Libya).




229. Id. at 31-32.
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4. Sudan
Sudan affirms governmental authority to enforce zakat both in the 1998
Constitution and the 2005 Transitional Constitution.23 The shift from colonial
systems of taxation to zakat was expected to eliminate the need for additional
taxes.23' The first step in this experiment began with the zakat law of 1980,
which provided for voluntary payment to a state-managed "Zakat Fund.,
232
Participation was made mandatory in 1984.233 Zakat is collected on invested
wealth and cash income.234 However, zakat on trade and agricultural products
accounts for the largest portions of the amount collected, representing
respectively 36% and 42%.235 Zakat is distributed to the eight categories
named in the Quran, with the largest portion in 2003, 61%, being paid to the
poor and needy.236 Of this amount, 40% was paid directly in cash.237 Another
14.5% goes to the zakat collectors, with smaller portions paid "in the way of
Allah," in administrative fees, to the indebted, to "the reconciled," and to the
wayfarer. 238 The category "in the way of Allah" has been extended to include
many types of charity, including clinical services at hospitals, digging wells
and constructing canals, settlement of nomads, and placement of refugees.239
In 2003, money paid "to the wayfarer" helped return Sudanese nationals
stranded in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.24 °
5. Malaysia
Malaysia is unique among zakat-enforcing nations in two ways. First,
zakat is enforced within the federal system at the state level by State Islamic
230. The Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan art. 10 (1998).
231. See Mohammad Ibrahim Mohammad, The Sudan, in INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH,
supra note 196, at 420-21.
232. Id. at 419-21.
233. Id. at 421-22.
234. THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, CHAMBER OF ZAKAT, START AND PERFORMANCE OF ZAKAT, 1, 2
(2003), www.zakat-chamber.gov.sd/download/ZAKAT _STATE.doc (last visited Dec. 21, 2009).
235. Id. at 2-3.
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 5.
240. Id.
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Affairs Councils, and there is significant diversity in interpretation and
practice. Second, regional systems have existed since the colonial period,
when earlier, more informal systems were institutionalized under British
rule.242 Over the last 18 years there has been an effort to streamline and
harmonize these systems, but enforcement power remains at the state level.
243
Zakat administration in Malaysia has struggled with two challenges. The
first is not unique to Malaysia or even to zakat; that is the challenge of
monitoring and enforcing payment.244 Modem accounting systems have
provided some advantages in government access to information regarding
zakatable goods.245 However, because state zakat agencies do not have the
powers of the federal tax authorities, they have difficulty enforcing payment
except when the basis for zakat is evident.2" This difficulty is tied to the
second challenge, namely the enforcement of zakat on agricultural goods
(which are somewhat easier to monitor than monetary instruments). The
largest traditional category of zakat in Malaysia is zakat on rice (padi)
production.247 Because peasant farmers tend to be some of the poorest citizens
of Malaysia, it would seem presumptively unfair to only tax their
production.2 48 Arguably, systematic enforcement of zakat (not to mention other
protections of an overtly Islamic economy) would shift the burden from padi
farmers.249 Some studies indicate that the emphasis of Malaysian zakat onpadi
creates the opportunity for strongly regressive impacts when viewed as a tax,
in such a way that seems contrary to the original purposes of zakat as a pious
duty and as a mechanism for promoting social justice.25 In an economy that
241. See Aidit bin Ghazali, Zakat Administration in Malaysia, in THE ISLAMIC VOLUNTARY SECTOR
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 85, 86-91 (Mohamed Ariff & Inst. of Se. Asian Studies eds., 1991).
242. See MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 109-20.
243. Id.
244. bin Ghazali, supra note 241, at 104-05.
245. Id.
246. BIN MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 180-81.
247. Id. at 182-86.
248. Id. at 185 ("The practice of confining agricultural zakat ('ushr) to a single crop, for example
paddy, is probably one of the greatest anomalies committed (consciously or unconsciously) in the name of
Shari'ah by the official 'ulama' of Malaysia.").
249. Id. at 186 ("The extension of the 'coverage' of zakat... focused only on agricultural products.
If we were to extend this to include wage earners and zakat on minerals, such as tin and petroleum, the
amount of zakat that could be collected would be substantial.").
250. Id. at 165.
Zakat... is intended (at the temporal level) to serve as an instrument for the redistribution of income
and wealth in Muslim society. However, due largely to the manner with which it is implemented in
Malaysia, it not only failed to achieve the desired objective, but on the contrary in many instances,
on the aggregate level, it accentuated income inequality.
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is now largely tied to wages (which are not expressly taxed under zakat), some
scholars argue that the understanding of zakatable production ought to be
construed outside of its originally agrarian and mercantile context."' This
would require new interpretations, new ijtihad.
6. Yemen
Like Saudi Arabia and Sudan, Yemen includes zakat authority in its
constitution. 2  Zakat was mandatory even before the Constitution253 made it
an absolute requirement.254 Yemen takes a traditional view of what is zakatable
and makes no analogy to include income, shares, or deposits. 25 Zakat is
assessed and collected by the Administration of Duties, which coordinates the
process at the national, govemorate and local levels.
256
IV. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON WEALTH AND DISTRIBUTION
It is difficult to evaluate legal zakat regimes for their effectiveness. In
considering whether or how Muslim governments might choose to
institutionalize zakat, I thought that it was important to try to identify apparent
relationships with the goals of an income redistribution system. Using a
sample set of 40 nations, including nearly all predominantly Muslim
countries, 257 I developed a database which allowed me to identify potential
relationships between the institutionalization of zakat and (1) wealth as
Id.
251. See generally id at 174-89.
252. The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen art. 21 (1994) ("The state shall collect the Zakat...
and shall spend it through its legal channels in accordance with the law.").
253. See Yemen Constitution art. 135 (1970) ("The alms tax (zakat) is one of the basic pillars of
Islam. The Government shall endeavour to collect it and to spend it correctly."), which was replaced by
Yemen Constitution art. 21 (1994).
254. See Geralyn M. Fallon, The Taxation of Companies andIndividuals in Yemen, 8 ARAB L. Q. 37,
41 (1993); see also Muhammad Yahya Hussein Al-'Adi, Yemen, in INSTrrUrIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH,
supra note 196, at 439-69.
255. Hussein Al-'Adi, supra note 254, at 446 (noting that zakat in Yemen is not applied to property
in actual use, income, shares, or deposits).
256. Id. at 456.
257. The only countries excluded are those with populations less than 500,000 or those that do not
generate economic data (Palestine and Kosovo).
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reflected by per capita GDP and (2) income stratification/economic equality
as reflected by GINI indices used by the UNDP and the World Bank.258
First, I ran regression analyses that indicated a correlation between
institutionalized zakat and both wealth (higher per capita GDP) and economic
equality (lower GINI index), with r's of .325 and .328, respectively. An r
correlation value over .3 typically indicates a causal relationship between the
independent variable (institutionalizing zakat, or not) and the dependent
variable (per capita GDP or GINI index). 9
In order to further illustrate this correlation, I created two crosstab studies
which divide countries into three categories: (1) those countries that do not
legally institutionalize zakat (24 countries), (2) those countries that use law to
establish a voluntary system for collecting and distributing zakat (10
countries), and (3) those countries that enforce mandatory zakat (6 countries).
This serves as the X-axis for both studies. The Y-axis for the Wealth Study
divides the countries roughly into thirds according to per-capita GDP (greater
than $9000, between $2410 and $9000, and less than $2410). The Y-axis for
the Equality Study divides countries into three groups based on GINI index (a
lower number is better). Divided roughly in thirds, those countries in the good
category have GINI indices under 36, the mid-range reflects GINI indices
between 36 and 41, and the poor range indicates GINI indices greater than 41.
As a frame of reference, Denmark has a GINI index of 23.2, the United States
has a GINI index of 45, and South Africa has a GINI index of 59.3.26' Note
that the sample pool appears to have relatively good GINI indices compared
to most comparable and even some more developed economies.
258. See Corrado Gini, Measurement of Inequality of Incomes, 31 ECON. J. 124, 124-26 (1921)
(noting that the GINI index is a measure of statistical dispersion most prominently used as a measure of
inequality of income distribution or inequality of wealth distribution. It was developed by Corrado Gini.
National GINI index numbers range from 23.2 in Denmark and 70.7 in Namibia); see U.N. Dev. Programme
[UNDP], Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity. Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis
(2006) (prepared by Kevin Watkins).
259. See generally JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
(2d ed. 1988).
260. U.N. Dev. Programme, supra note 258, at 335-37.
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A. Zakat and Wealth Study: The Wealth Study
Per Capita GDP According to Approach to Zakat
AGroac to Zakat
















For those countries that establish voluntary zakat institutions, 50% are in
the high wealth group, 40% are in the middle wealth group, and 10% are in the
low wealth group. For those countries that mandate zakat, 50% are in the high
wealth group, 33.3% are in the middle wealth group, and 16.7% are in the low
wealth group. This is in stark contrast to the countries that do not legalize
zakat. 25% of these countries are in the high income group, 29.2% are in the
middle group, and 45.8% are in the low income group. For whatever reason,
these countries tend to be poorer as a group. As Section II indicates, some oil-
producing countries have instituted legalization of zakat, which may impact





HeinOnline  -- 7 Pitt. Tax Rev. 75 2009-2010
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH TAX REVIEW
institutionalized zakat seems to argue against the claim that these policy
options are available only to wealthy countries.
Because of this surprising result, I felt obliged to consider why only two
nations that have effectively legalized zakat in some way fall into the low
wealth category: Yemen and Bangladesh. Yemen is one of the poorest
countries in the world and has struggled since reunification after the Cold War
to rebuild its economy.26" ' The socialist portion of its political legacy coming
from the former South Yemen (prior to reunification in 1990) might contribute
to the higher level of economic equality reflected in the country's relatively
low GINI index of 33.4.262 It is possible that commitment to economic equality
has been a higher value than increasing overall wealth. Bangladesh has been
one of the poorest countries in the world since its founding. Lack of resources
and vulnerability to natural disasters, particularly flooding, have made
development a tremendous challenge.263 So, it is not surprising that it remains
one of the poorer nations in the studies. However, the Government of
Bangladesh and a number of private initiatives, including the microfinance
movement pioneered by Muhammad Yunus, have had positive impacts in
terms of both wealth and equality.2"
Other than the apparent correlation, no other clear conclusions can be
drawn from the study. The countries that have legalized zakat have done so in
a wide variety of ways, and it is impossible to more clearly correlate the
advantages or disadvantages of these policy choices without detailed studies
of the specific economic impacts of particular zakat systems. Even so, the bias
towards wealth among nations legalizing zakat appears more than anecdotal
and justifies more detailed studies.
261. See generally PAUL DRESCH, A HISTORY OF MODERN YEMEN (2000).
262. See infra app. A.
263. See generally PK. MD. MOTIUR RAHMAN Er AL., THE CHRONICALLY POOR IN RURAL
BANGLADESH: LIVELIHOOD CONSTRAms AND CAPABiLrrEs (2009).
264. Id.
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B. Zakat and Economic Equality Study: The Equality Study
GINI Index According to Approach to Zakat
Approach to Zakat
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100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
As in the Wealth Study, the Equality Study indicates some sort of positive
relationship between institutionalization of zakat and economic equality. Of
countries with voluntary zakat institutions, 60% are in the high equality group,
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20% are in the middle equality group, and 20% are in the low equality group.
Of countries with mandatory zakat, 50% are in the high equality group, 16.7%
are in the middle equality group, and 33.3% are in the low equality group. This
contrasts with the countries that do not legalize zakat. Of these countries,
16.7% are in the high equality group, 41.7% are in the middle equality group,
and 41.7% are in the low equality group. For whatever reason, these countries
tend to have lower levels of economic equality as a group.
Although zakat might affect economic equality, it is also possible that
countries institutionalizing an income redistribution system such as zakat do
so to some extent because they are a priori more concerned with economic
inequality. As in the Wealth Study, I am particularly interested in the outlying
zakat jurisdictions with lower levels of economic equality.
Lebanon and Iran are the two countries with a voluntary legalized zakat
system, while Sudan and Malaysia are the two mandatory zakat jurisdictions
in this category. Lebanon, Sudan, and Iran are fairly easy to distinguish.
Lebanon is still dominated by Christian political parties, such that a zakat
system established for highly fragmented Muslim communities might not work
efficiently as a policy tool for income redistribution.26 Constitutional crises,
violence, and years of civil war also make Lebanon an exceptional case and
justify its role as an outlier regarding economic equality. Furthermore, Sunni
Muslims who would be most likely to contribute to a state-sponsored zakat
fund comprise only 26% of the population.2" So, even with high levels of
participation, this fund would be unlikely to address poverty on a national
level.
A history of internal violence and political struggle between Muslim and
Christian communities equally applies to the Sudan, where the redistributive
goals of zakat are less important than its symbolic role as a uniquely Islamic
analog for taxation and welfare.2 67 Sudan, in addition to being deeply divided
religiously, has been politically turbulent for the past 25 years. As such, it is
not an ideal subject for determining the impact of zakat. Sudan's outlier status
will be addressed with greater specificity in Section IV.C., below.
265. See Mallat, supra note 178, at 13, 41-42.
266. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: LEBANON (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drVrls/irf/2005/51604.htm.
267. Ahmed T. el-Gaili, Federalism and the Tyranny of Religious Majorities: Challenges to Islamic
Federalism in Sudan, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 531-36 (2004).
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Although Iran is in the low equality group, its GINI index reflects more
equitable distribution of wealth than found in the United States.268 As the only
explicitly Shi'i jurisdiction, zakat in Iran is subject to different legal rules in
terms offiqh, which might make it less likely that the impact of zakat would
correlate with Sunni jurisdictions. Finally, unequal distribution of oil wealth
might explain the slightly higher level of economic inequality; however, no
other oil producing nations are in the low equality category.
The more difficult case is Malaysia, which has become a model for both
developing economies and for moderate Muslim states.269 Although rapid
industrial development has contributed to an overall increase in wealth, it has
not resulted in an even distribution of resources. Some commentators have
actually indicated that zakat on crops (rice in particular) might have a
regressive effect.70 Further, since nearly half of the population is non-Muslim,
any system mandated for only a portion of the populace is less likely to have
broad distributive effect (as in the cases of Lebanon and Sudan described
above). Even so, Malaysia's zakat system has been given some credit for the
amelioration of poverty and has been touted as a model for other Muslim
271countries.
C. The Wealth and Equality Studies Conclusions
The studies seem to show some tendency toward both higher wealth and
economic equality among the Muslim jurisdictions that have legally
institutionalized zakat, and this correlation deserves further specific study. It
may also lend some confidence to countries that are considering such systems
that the existence of these systems does not appear to harm economies across
the board (though there is some argument that particular policies in Malaysia
and Pakistan, for example, have been problematic).272
268. See U.N. Dev. Programme, supra note 258, at 335 (noting that Iran has a GINI index of 43, while
the U.S. has a GINI index of 40.8).
269. See Wolfgang Klenner, The East Asian Development Model, in DEVELOPMENT MODELS,
GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIES: A SEARCH FOR THE HOLY GRAIL? 90 (John B. Kidd & Frank-Jurgen
Richter eds., 2006).
270. See bin Ghazali, supra note 241, at 104-05.
271. See, e.g., JAMES B. ANG, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MALAYSIA
(2009).
272. See BIN MtHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 165 (regarding Malaysia); Mayer, supra note 200, at
68-7 1(regarding Pakistan).
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Of the countries legalizing zakat, Sudan shows the lowest level of
economic equality and the fourth lowest level of wealth, making it the greatest
outlier in the sample. However, as explained earlier, Sudan may be
distinguished because it is deeply divided along religious and ethnic lines.273
Zakat is enforced to some extent as evidence of public Islamization in a
country with large non-Muslim communities. Massive poverty, civil unrest,
and political instability make Sudan a poor example of a stable society in
which to analyze discrete policies like zakat.
There are opportunities for further study. As Kuwait moves from a
voluntary to a mandatory system, it may be instructive to track the specific
impacts of the system in more systematically collecting and distributing zakat
funds. One challenge to studying economic inequality is the lack of data and
openness to World Bank surveys on the part of a number of predominantly
Muslim countries.274 Even for those countries that have already established
zakat systems for religious or legitimacy purposes, it makes sense to study the
effectiveness of these programs so that they can be adjusted to become more
efficient within the constraints of traditionalfiqh (or contemporaryfiqh where
applicable).
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MUSLIM COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE OR ARE
CONSIDERING INSTITUTIONALIZING ZAKAT
The analysis of traditional fiqh in Section 11, the qualitative analysis of
modem zakat jurisdictions in Section III, and the empirical studies in Section
IV all have implications for countries that have or are planning to
institutionalize zakat. Although this section is meant to address the particular
issues raised by zakat itself, some of the comments have broader relevance for
evaluating the mechanics of the system in terms of tax and distribution.
273. See generally ROBERT O. COLLINS, A HISTORY OF MODERN SUDAN (2008).
274. GINI indices for the Equality Study came from the Economist Intelligence Unit which derived
them synthetically in the absence of World Bank statistics. These statistics have been used in comparative
studies. See, e.g., INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2008: METHODOLOGY, RESULTS, AND
FINDINGS (2008), available at http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/ home.php.
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A. Observations and Recommendations
An analysis of the examples of legally institutionalized zakat reveals some
patterns that might indicate ways to increase the effectiveness of these policies.
First, there is the question of whether zakat payments ought to be enforced by
the state. Second, the state might play a positive role in the facilitation of zakat
by requiring greater transparency and accountability in the nonprofit sector.
Third, states might be able to optimize administrative costs. Fourth, active
state participation might provide a useful policy tool for poverty alleviation.
Finally, constructive engagement with religious ideas might be helpful in
societies wrestling with the appropriate relationship between law and religion.
1. Mandatory vs. Voluntary
There is precedent for both mandatory and voluntary systems within
Islamicfiqh.275 For countries that already have established tax systems that are
viewed as both legitimate and effective, it is not clear what benefits a
mandatory zakat regime would provide. Countries whose tax systems are
challenged as illegitimate might consider the advantages of enforcing zakat for
this reason. Countries without effective taxation systems to fund public
services, particularly poverty alleviation, might consider mandatory zakat if
it would provide marginal benefits over existing systems. However, because
most Muslim countries now have mandatory taxation (income, VAT, etc.),
mandatory zakat is probably unnecessary. 276 The empirical data reviewed in
Section III does not appear to indicate a statistically significant advantage to
choosing mandatory versus voluntary zakat administrations; however there
appears to be some correlation between having a zakat system (mandatory or
voluntary) and both higher wealth and economic equality. It will be worth
studying countries that have recently shifted from voluntary to mandatory
systems, particularly as other countries consider such a shift.277
275. ECONOMICS OF ZAKAH, supra note 7, at 25-26.
276. See Lawrence W. Kenny & Stanley L. Winer, Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical
Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime, 13 INT'L
TAX & PUB. FIN. 181 (2006).
277. See, e.g., Arksal Salim, The Influential Legacy ofDutch Islamic Policy on the Formation ofZakat
(Alms) Law in Modern Indonesia, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 683, 701 (2006) ("Many zakat agencies, both
government supported and privately sponsored, are intent on amending the current Zakat Law in order to
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Countries might consider promoting voluntary zakat for a number of
reasons. First, it provides support for charitable work that governments might
not be able to fund. Second, voluntary giving provides an opportunity for
building solidarity within the community by facilitating a pious obligation that
also contributes to the physical well-being of some and the general welfare.
Significantly, without compulsion and the threat of sanctions, contributors are
less likely to resent making payment or actively avoid payment.
2. Positive Role for the State
There are a number of steps that governments might take to facilitate
zakat. Like several of the countries studied in this article, they might establish
a governmental or semi-governmental agency to receive and distribute zakat
funds. This provides greater assurances that monies are used efficiently and for
the purposes intended by zakat.
To encourage participation in the system, countries might consider
making zakat contributions to the official fund tax deductible.278 In systems
where charitable gifts are not normally deductible, this creates a new incentive
for participating in the official system. Some systems, such as Indonesia's, still
receive only a small percentage of zakat funds.279 However, those percentages
are growing and will probably continue to grow as more people become aware
of the work such zakat funds can do. This relates to another element of
facilitating zakat education. Studies indicate that many Muslims are unaware
of the zakat obligation or how to calculate it.2'8 Muslim countries which
already fund religious work or education might wish to educate Muslim
citizens regarding zakat and opportunities for giving it.
make the payment of zakat obligatory.").
278. See, e.g., Jordanian Zakat Fund, http://www.zakatfund.org (illustrating tax-deductible nature of
the Jordanian zakat fund).
279. See PRIHATNA supra note 132, at 68-70 (explaining why only 12.5% of Indonesians pay zakat
through government sponsored entities).
280. See, e.g., M.A. SABZWARi, A STUDY OF ZAKAT AND USHR WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
PAKISTAN 1-2 (1979) (study indicating a low level of understanding of zakat in Pakistan); see also
PRIHATNA supra note 132, at 23 ("Most people [in Indonesia] have limited knowledge about zakat. They
only know about prayers, fasting and haj.").
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a. Transparency
To foster trust, governments might require disclosure by their zakat
institutions exceeding the requirements of individuals, mosques, and private
charities. If donors know that operating costs are reasonable and that
contributed money is used effectively, they might be more likely to participate
in the official system. Studies of Indonesia's system seem to indicate that most
citizens prefer to give within their local community, presumably both because
of social connections and because such contributions might be more easily
identifiable within the community.2 8' The clearer it is that money collected by
governmental organizations is used well and in ways that meet needs normally
unmet by local mosques and charities, the more willing donors will be to
participate in national programs.282 Rigorous transparency policies, such as
those of the Nasser Social Bank, provide zakat institutions an important
measure of credibility.283
b. Oversight
Regarding oversight, it is important to address the issue of Muslim
charities supporting violence. Certain literature is highly critical of Muslim
charities because of reported connections to organized violence.2
Investigation of some Muslim charities after 9/11 did uncover some potentially
problematic connections.285 However, one must not condemn Muslim charities
generally;286 many have played a vital role in poverty alleviation throughout
the world. Instead, the need for oversight strengthens the argument that
governments might play a constructive role in receiving zakat payments by
ensuring that funds reach appropriate beneficiaries and are not used to support
violence. Although one class of appropriate beneficiaries was traditionally
281. See PRIHATNA, supra note 132, at 6-7 (noting that most zakat donors in Indonesia give to
neighborhood funds, usually at the local mosque, or directly to beneficiaries).
282. Id. at 58--64.
283. See Monzer Kahf, AppliedInstitutional Models for Zakat Collection andDistribution in Islamic
Countries and Communities, in INSTITUTrONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH, supra note 196, at 202-04.
284. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 133, at 315-19.
285. Id.
286. See Laila Aal-Marayati, American Muslim Charities: Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25
PACE L. REV. 321,336-38 (2005).
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interpreted to include warriors who fight for the cause of Islam, it is unlikely
that modem militant groups (many of whom indiscriminately target Muslims
and non-Muslims alike) could be construed as "the cause of Allah. 28 7
3. Administration Costs
One potential pitfall of government-administered zakat programs is the
risk of high administrative costs. Ideally, private charities could minimize the
costs of administration, but where charities do not have rigorous disclosure
requirements, government programs with accountability mechanisms might
minimize costs more effectively. 288 A number of the statutory zakat programs
described in Section III contain mandatory caps on administrative costs.
289
Some adopt thefiqh tradition of limiting each beneficiary (including those who
collect and distribute zakat) to one-eighth of the total contributions.29 Others
have set more rigorous limits on costs. 291 Some states have allowed costs to be
internalized within the state budget.292 Perhaps the chief challenge to
evaluating costs is the dearth of financial disclosure by traditional zakat
287. See, e.g., Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Advertisement, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,2001, atA35.
We at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), along with the entire American Muslim
community are deeply saddened by the massive loss of life resulting from the tragic events of
September 1 th. American Muslims unequivocally condemn these vicious and cowardly acts of
terrorism. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families, friends and loved ones of those who have
been killed or injured. We also extend our gratitude to all the heroic firefighters, police offices and
emergency medical workers who continue to risk their lives in the ongoing rescue and relief efforts.
We join all Americans in calling for the swift apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators of
these crimes. May we all stand together through these difficult times to promote peace and love over
violence and hate.
Id.
288. See PRuIATNA, supra note 132, at 68 ("[BAZ and LAZ] need to work to encourage people to pay
their zakat through professional institutions like them to ensure optimal utilization.").
289. See supra Part m.B.
290. See, e.g., bin Ghazali, supra note 241, at 99-105 (describing the distribution of zakat funds in
Malaysia, noting the presumption of the Shafi'i school ofjurisprudence that each of the beneficiaries receive
an equal portion).
291. See, e.g., EcoNoMIcs OF ZAKAH, supra note 7, at 31 (indicating that no more than 10% of zakat
revenue in Libya may be used for administrative costs); see also Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, supra
note 195, ch. 4, § 8b (indicating that local zakat committees in Pakistan may use up to 10% of received
contributions for administrative costs); 1982 Amendment to the Zakat Act (Jordan) (indicating that no more
than 10% of zakat fund in Jordan can be used for administrative purposes).
292. See, e.g., ECONOMICS OF ZAKAH, supra note 7, at 37 ("[A]s the House is affiliated to the ministry
of Awqaf and Religious Affairs all its administrative expenditures are carried out by the general budget of
the government.").
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charities and mosques related to costs and distributions. Concern for costs and
questions regarding the ultimate beneficiaries of zakat monies certainly
contribute to the pattern of giving directly to the poor in the community.
Disclosure of and accountability for costs seems to make government funds an
increasingly attractive vehicle for zakat giving.293
4. Role in Poverty Reduction
Although donors are assured who the beneficiaries will be when they give
directly to the poor, such money may not be allocated to the most efficient
location to combat systemic problems of poverty. Alternatively, state
organized systems address broader societal patterns of poverty."l Such
systems can often reach the most needy rather than those most visible to
individual donors. 95 Further, coordinated systems can assure broader and more
equitable distribution. 296 Government information and resources allow them
to administer rational welfare systems nationally.297 Note that this line of
argument presumes the absence of a market of large, efficient charitable
organizations which might allocate resources more efficiently than
governments. In some cases, zakat money has funded community development
projects and job training to equip the poor to support themselves.2 98 Although
these efforts have been criticized because they are not explicitly included in
traditional zakatfiqh, they are nevertheless supported by some governments
which gives them some legitimacy.2 99
293. See, e.g., PRIHATNA, supra note 132, at 22 ("[Z]akat distribution through the government
institutions increased 9% [based on 2004 data].").
294. Id. at 24-25.
295. Id.
296. ld; see also Recommendations of the Third International Zakah Conference Held In Kuala
Lumpur Malaysia 19-22 Shawwal 1401H, in INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH, supra note 196, at
473-77 [hereinafter Recommendations] (recommending state facilitation of zakat administration and
international coordination of standards).
297. PRIHATNA, supra note 132, at 24-25.
298. See, e.g., Abd al-Qader Dahi al-Ajeel, Kuwait, in INSTITUmONAL FRAMEWORK OF ZAKAH, supra
note 196, at 276 (indicating that the zakat House in Kuwait "undertakes charity schemes such as mosques,
health centers, orphanages, schools, drilling of wells, etc. outside Kuwait"); see also bin Ghazali, supra note
241, at 99-103 (listing uses of zakat funds in Malaysia, including education, scholarships, medical
assistance etc.).
299. See al-Ajeel, supra note 298, at 270.
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5. Significance of Religion
Although predominantly Muslim countries could (and many do) adopt
secular welfare systems based on European or North American models, there
are both advantages and disadvantages to adopting an explicitly religious
system of taxation and welfare. Criticisms could be made from a secular or
pluralistic perspective, that is, a government, particularly one that has authority
over significant non-Muslim populations, ought not reify religious tradition at
the level of government. This argument has particular relevance in countries
with large non-Muslim populations such as Sudan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Argument against government involvement in zakat may also be rooted in a
commitment to Islamic principles. Since there is no unified global Muslim
community, individual state governments (most of which have no
acknowledged religious authority) are not in a position to enforce zakat
uniformly as in the early Caliphates. Instead, so the argument might go, such
state governments ought to simply allow for the voluntary contribution of
zakat by the individual believer. This perspective might prove consistent with
government support of voluntary zakat programs, which might be an example
of the comparative benefits of voluntary systems.
It is possible that government zakat programs have benefits without
resorting to religious justifications. To the extent that supporting such
programs deals with real policy challenges (e.g., poverty) or provides the state
with legitimacy in such a way that non-Muslim citizens are not marginalized,
these programs might be beneficial. The legitimacy argument is strengthened
from a religious perspective. Governments of predominantly Muslim countries
might be viewed as more legitimate to the extent that they validate and
facilitate traditional pious obligations such as zakat.3 °° To the extent that these
programs are viewed as equitable and efficient, they likely confer greater
legitimacy."°
300. See, e.g., Recommendations, supra note 296, at 473-77.
301. The contrary may be observed in Pakistan, where equitable enforcement has been heavily
litigated and continues to be a source of contention. See supra Part Il.C.2.
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B. Challenges for Muslim Countries Instituting Zakat
Zakat systems pose a set of common challenges for the countries that
choose to institutionalize them. As a matter of economic policy, governments
ought to consider the concrete impact of zakat on the poor; in tax parlance, this
would include regard for progressivity. In terms of benefits law, it would
consider the identities and needs of zakat beneficiaries. As described earlier,
modem Muslim countries have adopted a wide variety of zakat collection
measures. The efficiency of these options ought to be considered by
governments considering adoption or modification of zakat policy. The
question of who collects and distributes zakat raises similar considerations.
Because zakat is rooted in religious law, its enforcement by a modem state
raises questions regarding the appropriate role of religion in government.
These issues are particularly salient for religious minorities. The adaptation of
Islamic jurisprudence also raises questions related to the appropriateness of
new interpretations. Finally, since most Muslim countries have incorporated
many European notions of law, including tax and benefit law, the introduction
of zakat may inefficiently duplicate or compete with existing systems.
1. Progressive
In the simplest sense, a progressive tax takes a larger percentage from the
income of high-income people than it does from low-income people." 2
Although tax progressivity is sometimes defined as a tax whose rate rises as
income rises, as in the U.S. system of graduated income tax brackets, this
paper will assume the simpler meaning which can still be distinguished from
regressive or proportionate taxes.303
Tax exemption to the extent of nisab ensures some degree of progressivity
in zakat as a tax regime. This is particularly true if nisab accurately measures
minimal costs of living. However, at the upper end of the wealth and income
spectrum, there is a drop in progressivity because rates are fixed.3"
302. See, e.g., CHARLES 0. GALvIN & BORIS 1. BnTrKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE
SHOULD IT BE? (1969).
303. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look
at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1907-08 (1987).
304. See id. at 1907 ("The progressivity of a tax rate structure is defined by the effective tax burden
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The degree of progressivity also depends on the item taxed. Agricultural
products which are measured annually are likely to represent something like
income, particularly in agrarian societies. As a form of income tax, these 5-
10% rates are subject to critique as regressive, particularly because those who
produce well above their needs pay the same rate as those who make just over
nisab.305 However, the 2.5% tax on wealth does not function as an income tax
and is less subject to such criticisms." 6
Some mandatory zakat systems emphasize the elements of zakat that
function as income tax (Malaysia).0 7 Others emphasize tax on wealth
(Pakistan).3"' Others claim to enforce zakat according to classical
jurisprudence (Yemen).39 Each of these options creates particular advantages
and challenges for making zakat an effective system of poverty alleviation.
Emphasis on taxing agricultural production risks putting a disproportionate
burden on a poorer segment of society.310 Emphasis on taxing wealth creates
challenges in both estimating and collecting zakat.1 In Pakistan, deducting
zakat from bank accounts on a fixed date caused massive withdrawals to avoid
compliance.312 Countries that enforce zakat in its multiple classical forms
might create particular avoidance strategies, but Saudi Arabia seems to have
systematized collection, creating the appearance that it is enforcing its tax code
like any other wealthy country.3 13 Obviously, voluntary systems avoid having
to address these issues.
on differing income classes. Under a progressive tax, the percentage of income paid to the government, or
average tax rate, rises as income rises.").
305. Id. at 1907-08.
306. David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAx L. REv. 499, 578
(2000) (concluding that a flat percentage wealth tax could be as progressive as the current form of graduated
income tax).
307. See BIN MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 185-86 (zakat in Malaysia emphasizes paddy
production).
308. Mayer, supra note 200, at 68 (Pakistan emphasizes zakat on depository accounts.)
309. See Hussein Al-'Adi, supra note 254, at 439-48 (Yemen has historically collected zakat on a
regional basis, and its current institutional form relies directly on thefiqh tradition).
310. See BIN MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 185-86; bin Ghazali, supra note 241, at 96.
311. See supra Part n.B.3 for references to disagreement over visible versus non-visible assets. See
also Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 306, at 578 (noting valuation is one of the major problems with any
wealth tax).
312. See Aazim, supra note 208.
313. See Dept. of Zakat and Income Tax, http://www. dzit.gov.sa/en/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 21,
2009) (Saudi Arabia).
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2. Beneficiaries
Another challenge for both mandatory and voluntary zakat regimes is how
to allocate resources to appropriate beneficiaries. Some systems attempt to
distribute portions (in some countries equal portions) to all eight of the
Quranic categories described in Section I.B. 1., above.314 Some systems clearly
emphasize particular groups, especially the poor and needy. To the extent that
groups other than the poor and needy are the beneficiaries, poverty alleviation
is not likely to be served even though the distribution is jurisprudentially
justified.
Most zakat systems distribute money, although some distribute goods or
services. Because all of these systems distribute limited amounts, there is
inevitably a high demand for distributions.315 In Pakistan, announcement of
zakat distributions has led to rushes by potential beneficiaries to reach
distribution sites, resulting in injuries and occasional violence.316
The notion that the poor have a legal claim on the property of the rich in
the form of zakat bears some resemblance to the principle of the "preferential
option for the poor" in Catholic social thought.3 17 Roman Catholic liberation
theologian Gustavo Guttierrez coined the term "preferential option for the
poor" in the 1960's, although it is deeply rooted in the scriptural and
theological tradition of the Church. I8 Under the principle, it is a moral
imperative to create conditions for marginalized voices to be heard, to defend
the defenseless, and to assess lifestyles, policies, and institutions in terms of
their impact on the poor and the excluded. 9 Similarly, zakat is an imperative
to share resources with the poor and needy in such a way that constrains
ownership rights. Both Catholic and Islamic jurisprudence view property rights
in terms of stewardship rather than as absolute. In both cases the strongest
314. See bin Ghazali, supra note 241, at 99-101 (noting the state of Selangor, in particular, allocates
zakat to all eight of the Quranic beneficiaries).
315. See, e.g., Zulfiqar Memon, Sindh in Danger of Losing Zakat Funds, DAWN, May 27, 2008,
available at http://www.dawn.com/2008/05/27/nat13.htm ("About 100,000 deserving people of the province
who depend on Zakat funds for their needs have to wait longer than expected for the second installment
316. See id.
317. See id. at 374-76.
318. James B. Nickoloff, Introduction to GUSTAVO GurIERREz: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 1, 12 (James
B. Nickoloffed., 1996).
319. Id. at 12-14; see also GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS
AND SALvATIoN 108-12 (Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans. & eds., 1973).
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claim of right can only be made after obligations to others (rooted in the
preferential option for the poor or zakat, respectively) are met.
3. Collection Mechanisms
Collection regimes for states that enforce zakat vary widely. As mentioned
earlier, Pakistan attempted to streamline the process by having depository
institutions enforce the contribution on a fixed date every year.320 Some states
such as Malaysia have local enforcement personnel who estimate the
productivity of agricultural resources.32' Saudi Arabia appears to have a
sophisticated system for monitoring and estimating zakat.3 22 Even so, there is
evidence that some voluntary systems (as in Indonesia) result in higher
participation and collection rates than countries with mandatory zakat
(Pakistan for example).323
4. Administrators
Although administrators are eligible to receive money from zakat
revenues as valid beneficiaries, it is less clear what qualifications they ought
to have. In most mandatory systems, collectors are government officials (or
perhaps local officials in a federal system such as Malaysia). Ideally, the
Pakistani system required almost no resources for collection because the onus
was placed directly on depository institutions.324 In countries with voluntary
systems, administrators may be government employees or they may simply be
the employees of the semi-governmental entity established to receive and
distribute zakat. In voluntary systems, the role of government calculation and
enforcement of zakat falls away, so there is less administrative cost.
320. See Ordinance No. VI of 1982, supra note 161, §§ 1-2 (valuation of zakatable property is made
at the beginning of the zakat year, the 1st day of Ramadan).
321. See BIN MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 140-42 (describing the selection process and collection
protocols for zakat collectors who must estimate the zakat owed on particular plots of land).
322. See generally Abdul Aziz M. Rashid Jamjoon, Saudi Arabia, in INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEwORK
OF ZAKAH, supra note 196, at 403.
323. See Hassan, supra note 127 (noting that 60% of Pakistanis paid zakat according to the survey,
as opposed to 94% of Indonesians).
324. See Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, supra note 197, ch. 2, § 3 (depository institutions are
obligated to collect zakat and forward funds to the Central zakat Committee).
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Regardless of who is designated to administer zakat, that person will have to
be compensated to secure their services. This might be challenging in systems
that use traditional caps on the amount that zakat collectors may receive (1/8
or 1/10).325
5. Encouraging Piety
As described earlier, some countries have institutionalized zakat in order
to foster Islamic identity and piety. Both Indonesia and Malaysia (a voluntary
and a mandatory zakat enforcement jurisdiction, respectively) have high rates
of zakat participation.3 26 Perhaps ironically, Pakistan, which has the most
truncated collection system, also has one of the lowest rates of zakat giving.
One explanation might be that most Pakistanis own less than the nisab and are
exempt from zakat liability. Another explanation might be that the automatic
system generates resentment of attempts to enforce traditional piety, leading
to avoidance.327 Even within predominantly Muslim societies, state
encouragement of piety might not be considered an appropriate policy goal.
In some traditional Muslim societies, however, encouraging devotion and piety
might be a significant concern of government. Voluntary systems tend not to
generate resentment in the way mandatory enforcement might. By providing
incentives like tax deductibility of contributions, states can incentivize zakat
contributions without the risk of alienation that mandatory systems pose.
6. New Exercise of Ijtihad
A number of commentators have observed that zakat systems might
become more effective if they are reimagined consistent with the Quranic
principles but not necessarily according to the rules of traditional fiqh.325 As
325. See bin Ghazali, supra note 241, at 87-88 (compares Malaysian states that subsidize the costs
of zakat collection as opposed to those that only allow a fixed portion of zakat revenues to be used for this
purpose).
326. See Hassan, supra note 127 (80% of Malaysians and 94% of Indonesians gave zakat according
to the survey).
327. See Aazim, supra note 208 (describing mass withdrawals from accounts in order to avoid zakat
valuation and deduction).
328. See, e.g., BIN MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 182-89 (recommending changes to zakat in
Malaysia, some of which would necessitate new interpretations of the textual sources).
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an example, some scholars argue that nisab ought to be recalculated to reflect
basic cost of living rather than relying exclusively on measures of
commodities (whether gold, silver, wheat, rice, or cows) that have different
values in contemporary economies.329 This move would allow countries to
ensure that basic living costs are exempt from zakat and contribute to
progressivity, but it would require a reinterpretation of the sources offiqh.
Because such interpretation has generally been disallowed in Sunni
jurisdictions for more than 700 years, this would reflect an intentional opening
of the "gates of ijtihad."33 If modem jurisdictions could disregard or modify
thefiqh tradition, they could shift from a legal interpretive posture of imitation
(taqlid) to one of broader interpretive authority.3 3' Although a number of
Islamic scholars have proposed a renewed 'tihad, no country has openly
claimed to be engaging in new ijtihad in the formation of zakat systems. On
the contrary, justifications rooted in fiqh and the usul al-fiqh lend these
systems legitimacy."' The role of traditional fiqh in modem statutes raises
fascinating questions for future study: who writes these zakat statutes, what is
their training in Islamicfiqh, on what basis do the statutes claim legitimacy,
and does it matter?
7. Minorities
The question of how to treat minorities within a legal zakat framework is
complex. The statistical analysis in Section III seems to indicate that countries
with social unrest and religious division (Sudan and Lebanon in particular)
might have less prosperity and economic equality.333 Zakat as a form of tax
levied only on Muslims reinforces the classical distinction between Muslims
329. Id. at 185.
330. See generally Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of ltihad Closed?, 16 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STuD.
3-41 (1984) (describing the dispute over whether the need for new interpretation ended in or shortly after
the third/tenth century once legal rules in the school of jurisprudence were well-developed).
331. See LOMBARDI, supra note 119, at 83-92 (describing and contextualizing modem efforts to
restore the traditions of ijtihad).
332. See Recommendations, supra note 296, at 475.
The Conference calls upon zakat institutions to ensure that their performance of the collection and
distribution of zakat must be compatible with the provisions of Shari'ah, bearing in mind that zakat
is an act of financial worship. In addition, this will help to promote the confidence and trust of the
zakat-payers and increase the efficiency of zakat institutions.
Id.
333. See supra Part IV.
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and non-Muslims which legally disadvantaged non-Muslims even if the
system provided for religious toleration.334 Of the countries that enforce
mandatory payment of zakat, Sudan and Malaysia, in particular, must wrestle
with the consequences of alienating large non-Muslim communities.'"
Legalizing a religious system of taxation that reinforces outsider status might
undermine national integrity and solidarity.
The question of minorities is not limited to the Muslim/non-Muslim axis.
Many Muslim countries have a patchwork of diversity among
Muslims-representing all four of the Sunni schools, the traditional Shi'a
communities, and even communities that self-identify as Muslim but are not
viewed as orthodox by other Muslims. Perhaps the best example of this tension
is found in Pakistan, where the greatest challenge to mandatory zakat has been
made on the basis of diversity. Early on, Shi 'a communities objected to the
Ordinance because it applied a standard rooted in Hanafifiqh that was quite
different from the Jafari Shi 'i rules.336 These communities won an exemption
from the system on that basis.337 The Ahmadi community, which is not
considered to be Muslim by the Pakistani government, argued that its members
could not be subject to the Ordinance unless the government conferred upon
them legal status as Muslims. 331 Unwilling to do this, Pakistan instead
exempted Ahmadis from paying zakat.339 Perhaps the most significant
challenge came from Sunnis who argued that they should be allowed to opt out
as well if they followed a particular school of thought (madhhab) or tradition
that conflicted with the Ordinance.34 As a result, many wealthy Pakistanis
334. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-91 (1996) (describing the secondary status of non-Muslims
under Muslim rule).
335. See infra app. A (noting that both countries have large non-Muslim populations: Sudan 30% and
Malaysia 40%).
336. Mayer, supra note 200, at 72 ("[The government of Pakistan] underestimated the strength of the
opposition to the new tax by members of the Shi'a community.").
337. Zakat and Ushr Ordinance of 1980, supra note 195, ch. 1, § 3(a).
[Nbo Zakat or Ushr shall be charged or collected... [from a] person who [swears before a magistrate
and two witnesses] ... that he is a Muslim and follower of the recognizdfiqhs... and that his faith
and the saidfiqh do not oblige him to pay the whole or any part of zakat or Ushr ....
Id.
338. Pakistan Zakat Levy, ASIAN REcORDER, June 2, 1988, at 15578.
339. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM OR RELIGION, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2002) (noting that non-
Sunni and non-Muslim citizens are now exempt from the collection of zakat).
340. See Pakistan v. Farzana Asa, supra note 223; Clark, supra note 201.
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avoid the automatic withdrawals from their accounts by filing the appropriate
exemption form every year.34'
Every country must address the treatment of various Muslim and non-
Muslim groups under zakat rules. Classical jurisprudence provides some
answers, but not all. It is certainly a topic that warrants further consideration
by Muslim legal scholars and policy makers.
8. Integration within a Comprehensive Economic System
Zakat was not originally enforced as or expected to be a modular policy
that could be dropped into economies with values antagonistic to Islam. It was
a devotional act of piety with redistributive effects that played a role within a
larger set of economic mechanisms intended to promote social justice.3 42 Zakat
originated in a largely agrarian society with a significant trade infrastructure.343
Social and economic relations generally followed family, clan, and tribal
lines.3" These relationships created an expectation of support within the
group.
34 5
Islam challenged some practices that were presumed to prevent prosperity
and equitable distribution of resources by prohibiting exploitive trade, interest,
and risk that could not be calculated.3" With the recent massive upheavals in
Western-style capitalism, some scholars have started to reflect on the possible
advantages of alternative systems, including Islam.347 Classical Islam values
341. See Aazim, supra note 208 (noting that by 2007, many depositors (presumably Sunni and Shi'a)
exercised the right to be exempt from zakat on religious grounds, while some still withdraw cash from
accounts prior to the valuation date).
342. See generally Ahmad Oran & Salim Rashid, Fiscal Policy in Early Islam, 44 PUB. FIN. 75 (1989)
(describing economic policies of early Islam).
343. See ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 43-46 (1991).
344. See CHARLES LINDHOLM, THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST: TRADITION AND CHANGE 84-88 (revised
ed. 2002) (describing the importance of family, clan and tribe affiliation in the period of the early Caliphs,
who are the source of much of the Sunna of zakat).
345. Id. at 49-62 (discussing kinship obligations in the Arab Middle East).
346. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L HAYES III, IsLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND
RETURN 53-128 (1998) (detailed analysis of financial regulation in the Quran, Sunna, andfiqh literature).
347. See, e.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's Social Justice or Muslim Cant?: Langdellianism
and the Failures of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 89, 133 (2007).
Some may accuse the author of lifting longstanding prohibitions in the Islamic framework merely
to satisfy global commercial demand. However, it seems clear from current experience that at some
level the demands of the marketplace will reign supreme under any modality. The only question is
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private property rights, but in the context of divine ownership and human
stewardship.348 It encourages trade, investment, partnerships, and trusts?49
Honesty, integrity, industry, and innovation are all valued.350 Contracts
presumed to be exploitive are prohibited.35' The charging of interest is
(presumably) prohibited." 2 Risk that results in the inability to value a business
interest is prohibited. 53 This system could potentially apply to futures,
derivatives, and the class of instruments that nearly bankrupted the entire
American financial sector.354 Zakat is an instrument intended to provide relief
for the poor and disadvantaged when families and communities are unable to
meet basic needs. 355 Thus, it fits into a larger complex of economic values,
relationships, and institutions.
Some scholars argue that zakat cannot meet its potential outside of that
context.356 The set of countries that have legally institutionalized zakat have
a variety of approaches to these other issues. Some, like Iran, view zakat as a
small part of the overall Islamic economy. 57 Others, like Jordan,358
whether to adopt a system that acknowledges this reality while retaining a distinctively Islamic
character infused with populist notions of social justice and fairness, or to deceive the Muslim
populace with elaborate obfuscatory measures intended to retain the form of profit-sharing while
concealing the substantive reality of debt and risk-based finance.
Id.; see also Asad Zaman, Islamic Economics: A Survey of the Literature 79-80 (Religions & Dev. Research
Programme, Working Paper No. 22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfmn?abstractid=1282786; Alex Berenson, How Free ShouldA Free MarketBe?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 5,2008,
at WK. 1 (noting that the $700 billion bailout of Wall Street, including government ownership of bank stock,
along with the inevitable wave of new regulation mean an end to hypercapitalism).
348. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 346, at 56 ("We thus fmdfiqh statements that everything is God's
property, and that man deals with it only as agent. Every worldly benefit comes to mankind from God, as
his providence.").
349. See id at 53-178.
350. MUHAMMAD, supra note 23, at 14-21.
351. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 346, at 74-93 (describing the prohibitions against riba (usually
translated oversimply as "interest") and gharar ("risk")).
352. Id. at 77-87; see also Hanoudi, supra note 347, at 111-14.
353. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 346, at 87-93; Hamoudi, supra note 347, at 114-15 (for
descriptions of gharar ("risk") prohibitions).
354. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 346, at 154 ("The chief problem is that the conventional tools for
risk management, hedges and derivatives of various kinds (futures, forward contracts, options, swaps, etc.),
are presumptively invalid under Islamic law.").
355. See Oran & Rashid, supra note 342, at 83-85, 90-93.
356. See, e.g., Ilyas Ba-Yunus, A Note on the Social Implication of Zakah in Modern Times, in SOME
ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMICS OF ZAKAH 180, 180-81 (M. Raquibuz Zaman ed., 1979) ("Zakah, therefore,
cannot be successfully implemented in a non-Islamic social and economic environment. Zakah is only a part
of the total Islamic system. Unless the whole Islamic system is introduced, introduction of Zakah will bring
very little fruit.").
357. See generally Parvin Alizadeh, Introduction to THE ECONOMY OF IRAN: DILEMMAS OF AN
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Indonesia,359 and Malaysia36 have not attempted to entirely replace the
capitalist colonial institutions they inherited in the 20th century with Islamic
ones. If there is some relationship between institutional commitment to zakat
and economic prosperity and equality, it might not be necessary to artificially
Islamize an economy; however, Islam's role in the economy, whether in
banking, securities, derivatives, or trade, remains a potent political question in
many Muslim countries.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-MUSLIM LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Although the religious elements of zakat may not have relevance for
secular tax and welfare systems, there are a number of insights that law and
policymakers might glean from this rich tradition of jurisprudence. As a
practical matter of tax implementation, zakat is an example of a modest wealth
tax combined with a form of income tax. As a theoretical matter, zakat
supports the ethical conclusions of philosophers and tax scholars who contend
that property rights are attached to post rather than pre-tax income. To the
extent that zakat is considered a principal source of revenue for public
programs, it might imply a limited role for government, focusing on equitable
distribution of goods. I take a pragmatic approach to considering potentially
illustrative or beneficial ideas from religious traditions. However, I recognize
that some object to including ideas drawn from religious tradition in legal and
policy discourse.
A number of prominent tax scholars, including Deborah Schenk, 36 ' David
Shakow, and Reed Shuldiner,3 62 have proposed the possibility of using a
wealth tax along, with an income or consumption tax in the case of Schenk, or
an earned income component in the case of Shakow and Shuldiner. These
scholars posit that a wealth tax might be superior to the current form of U.S.
income tax and that studying wealth taxes, at the very least, provides helpful
ISLAMIC STATE (Parvin Alizadeh ed., 2000).
358. See generally WARWICK KNOWLES, JORDAN SINCE 1989: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
(2005).
359. See BRUCE GLASSBuRNER, THE ECONOMY OF INDONESIA 2-5 (Equinox 2007) (1971).
360. See Bryan K. Ritchie, Politics and Economic Reform in Malaysia (William Davidson Institute
Working Paper No. 655, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=509682.
361. See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAx L. REv. 423,465-66
(2000).
362. See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 306, at 499.
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insights on tax theory.3 63 Zakat, as a form of taxation, argues for the
practicability of such systems, since it has actually been enforced in a variety
of contexts over the past fourteen-hundred years. Further tax scholarship might
find fertile opportunities for exploring the impacts of wealth taxes in those
jurisdictions that currently enforce zakat collection. The most obvious
countries to examine would be those that have implemented zakat broadly and
successfully. These would likely include Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
Kuwait will also be an interesting jurisdiction to study, since it is in the
process of converting from a voluntary to a mandatory system of zakat.
Pakistan and Sudan have both had economic and legal challenges to their zakat
systems that make them less suitable candidates for studying the impact of
wealth taxes. Although Libya has not encountered similar difficulties, its
enforcement of zakat has not included wealth tax elements.
Zakat emerged from a religious tradition that views property rights in the
context of ultimate divine ownership. Thus, human property interests are
rooted in stewardship rather than an absolute right. Even so, Islam takes this
property interest quite seriously, and in such a way that it might be considered
analogous to common law notions of property. However, Islamic visions of
justice differ from most libertarian models in their concern for equitable
distribution. Perhaps the clearest example of this value is found in zakat
tradition, which gives the poor a vested right in pre-tax property to the extent
of zakat (although there is not agreement among the schools as to whether this
right is in personam or in rem).3" This understanding of property appears to
be consistent with the ethic proposed by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, and
arguably for the same fundamental reason-that justice must be evaluated in
terms of an entire economy rather than in the narrower sense of tax justice.365
In other words, fairness must be measured for society as a whole, rather than
for a single policy in isolation. Their solution to this problem for tax theory is
to imagine property rights in post-tax income only. Taxes are a necessary
precondition to the opportunity for generating wealth, particularly in complex
economies like the U.S. or the European Union. So the claim to property rights
according to Murphy and Nagel can only be made on the amount that remains
after taxes have been collected sufficiently to support the infrastructures that
make wealth creation possible.366 The tradition of zakat and Islamic philosophy
363. Id. at 500.
364. See AL-QARDAW], supra note 22, at 543-44.
365. See MURPHY &NAGEL, supra note 10, at 44-45, 73-75.
366. See id. at 74.
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related to property provides an opportunity to explore these ideas in a
comparative and historical context that might add depth to the discourse of
moral and political philosophy in this area.
To the extent that Islamic jurisprudence limits governments to the
traditional taxes in thefiqh tradition, it seems to envision a society in which
political power is primarily exercised to provide security and ensure a fair
distribution of wealth. The legal claims of the poor are limited to zakat
distributions (although the extensive network of charitable trusts that evolved
also provided for the material needs of the poor as a complement). The legal
claim of legitimacy in taxation was limited to the traditional taxes (zakat, poll
taxes on non-Muslims, duties, etc.), so that a government's impulse to spend
would be inherently constrained by its right to exact taxes. This sort of fixed
limit on government power to tax could provide insights for theories of the
state and government power outside of the Islamic context.
Some readers will likely object to my proposal that theory and practice
rooted in religious tradition ought to play a role in public reason. I am
sympathetic to the concern that religion and religious ideas have been used to
justify or effect oppression but have three responses to this concern. First, the
proposal to consider religious ideas in public discourse assumes as a general
principle that including more ideas adds depth to public discourse even when
those ideas are rejected. Second, the catastrophic failure of the U.S. economy,
particularly the financial sector, justifies creative, pragmatic
thinking-including analyses of economic systems that have not been
considered before. Third, if religion has been a source of oppression when it
has been included in public discourse, considering religious ideas that might
promote social justice and subvert oppression might be theoretically justifiable
as a counterbalance. In fact, one can hardly argue that religion does not
currently play a powerful, and at times pernicious, role in the formation of law
and policy, though it is often masked with other justifications. Openly
considering ideas from religious traditions for their role in contributing to
justice, rather than subverting it, provides transparency and may actually
counter the impact of oppressive religious discourse, rather than magnifying
it.
367
367. See Powell, supra note 20, at 334-40.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The fiqh of zakat provides a rich and varied body of jurisprudence.
Modem statutory attempts to codify this tradition have actually furthered the
development of this interpretive tradition despite prohibitions against iftihad.
Evidence that zakat is positively correlated with both wealth and economic
equality and that it has contributed to poverty alleviation justifies its further
study. Muslim states may wish to consider the experience of those countries
that have institutionalized zakat in considering zakat measures or reforms.
Non-Muslim law and policy makers may find further study of zakat helpful in
developing alternatives to current assumptions regarding tax theory, even
though the tradition is rooted in religious thought. Sincere interest in this
Islamic legal tradition may also contribute to deeper understanding across
cultural and religious boundaries and promote constructive dialogue that leads
to cooperative efforts to achieve the mutual goals of social justice and poverty
alleviation in particular.
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368. Population and GINI figures come from the UNDP 2007-2008 Human Development Report.
U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human
Solidarity in a Divided World (2007) (prepared by Kevin Watkins). Where GINI numbers were not available
from UNDP, I have used numbers from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Somalia 9,118,000 272 None 30
Sudan 37,700,000 3,093 Mandatory 51
Syria 19,400,000 4,498 None 42
Tajikistan 6,533,900 1,637 None 32.6
The Gambia 1,572,300 2,402 None 50.2
Tunisia 10,200,000 9,630 None 39.8
Turkey 74,300,000 10,380 None 43.6
Turkmenistan 6,700,000 9,483 None 40.8
UAE 4,900,000 35,516 Voluntary 31
Uzbekistan 26,500,000 2,542 None 36.8
Yemen 22,008,200 1,015 Mandatory 33.4
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